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Summary 
Exposure and response prevention (ERP) treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
has repeatedly been demonstrated as an efficient treatment for OCD and can be learned 
relatively easy by inexperienced student therapists (paper I). ERP was developed based on 
behavioral principles and the mechanisms of change have been suggested to involve 
reciprocal inhibition, counter-conditioning, habituation, extinction, or informal network-based 
emotional processing. More recent theories suggest cognitive and metacognitive beliefs as 
essential in the maintenance of OCD and that improvement following treatment could be 
mediated by changes in these beliefs. In paper II the validity of cognitive models of OCD and 
the metacognitive model of OCD was empirically tested. Support for the role of thought 
fusion beliefs, beliefs about rituals, and stop signals as predictors of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms was documented. These metacognitive variables predicted more variance in 
obsessive compulsive symptoms than ordinary cognitions. Paper III documented further 
support for the metacognitive model by demonstrating empirically that change in 
metacognitions was a better predictor of treatment outcome than cognitive constructs such as 
perfectionism/certainty and responsibility/harm. The results suggested that modification of 
metacognitions could mediate reductions in symptoms when delivering ERP for OCD. 
However, the metacognitive model needs further investigation with more rigorous studies and 
analyses. Moreover, although the thesis suggests that changes in metacognition may be 
essential in ERP treatment of OCD it did not evaluate metacognitive therapy. In addition, the 
relationship between change in metacognition and change in specific obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms was not specified. This can now be tested using the Norwegian adaptation of the 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised which seems to posses adequate psychometric 
properties allowing for dimensional assessment of obsessive-compulsive subtypes (Paper IV). 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 4th edition (DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) the primary feature of Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD) is the presence of recurrent obsessions or compulsions that are time 
consuming (take more than one hour a day) and cause marked distress or impairment. 
Additional diagnostic criteria are that individuals with OCD have at some time during the 
disorder recognized that their obsessions or compulsions are excessive and unreasonable. The 
disorder should not be caused by another mental disorder such as Tourette’s disorder, 
schizophrenia, major depression, or organic mental disorder. Untreated OCD is associated 
with several adverse consequences for employment, work productivity, and social/family 
functioning (e.g., Calvocoressi et al., 1995; Koran, Thienemann, & Davenport, 1996; Leon, 
Portera, & Weissman, 1995; Magliano et al. 1996; Rasmussen, & Eisen, 1992; Torres, Prince, 
Beggington, P. et al. 2006). Also in Norway, substantial impairment has been documented for 
children and adolescents with OCD (Valderhaug & Ivarsson, 2005). 
Obsessions are persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced as 
inappropriate and intrusive, while compulsions are repetitive excessive behaviors used to 
prevent or reduce anxiety or distress and to neutralize or prevent feared consequences. 
Compulsions are not realistically connected to what they intend to prevent. In diagnostic 
interviews such as the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, 
DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994) the obsessions assessed cover topics relating to doubting, 
contamination, nonsensical impulses, aggressive impulses, sexual obsessions, 
religious/satanic obsessions, causing accidental harm to others, experiencing horrific images, 
and nonsensical thoughts/images. Compulsions assessed include neutralizing (counting), 
checking, washing, hoarding, internal repetition (obsessing), and adhering to certain rules or 
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sequences (ordering). These different expressions of OCD have been referred to as subtypes 
of OCD.  
The OCD construct has yet to be explored in Norway, but there is little evidence for 
dramatic cultural differences in western cultures although some cultural impact could occur 
(e.g. Pallanti, 2008). The typical subtypes of OCD are usually labeled as: washing (excessive 
washing and cleaning often in relation to obsessions concerning contamination), obsessing 
(experiencing unwanted intrusive thoughts that are difficult to get rid of), checking (often 
related to thoughts about accidents such as fire, burglary etc.), ordering (arranging and 
aligning objects), neutralizing (such as repeated use of “magical” numbers), and hoarding 
(collecting and rarely discarding objects). However, the role of hoarding has been somewhat 
unclear. 
It has been reported that obsessive-compulsive symptoms correlate with aspects of 
hoarding severity (Frost, Steketee, & Grisham, 2004; Frost, Steketee, Williams et al., 2000), 
and that doubting, checking, and reassurance seeking before discarding appear to be 
functionally similar to compulsive rituals (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). Still, it is controversial 
whether compulsive hoarding is a subtype of OCD or not (e.g., Tolin, Frost, & Steketee, 
2007; Wu & Watson, 2005). Compared with other subtypes and patients with other anxiety 
disorders, individuals with compulsive hoarding typically report higher levels of depression 
and functional impairment, low marriage rates, social anxiety, and dependent personality 
traits (Frost, Steketee, Williams, & Warren, 2000; Kim, Steketee, & Frost, 2001). Individuals 
with hoarding symptoms also show poorer treatment outcome in pharmacological and 
cognitive behavior therapy compared to OCD patients without such symptoms (Abramowitz, 
Franklin, Schwartz, & Furr, 2003; Steketee & Frost, 2003). Other characteristics reported 
have been poor insight, treatment refusal, and lack of cooperation (Christensen & Greist, 
2001; Damecour & Charron, 1998; Greenberg, 1987; Greenberg, Witztum, & Levy, 1990; 
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Tolin, Frost, & Steketee, 2007). In summary, it seems that hoarding has traits resembling 
OCD (as many other psychological disorders do), but also has certain differences. 
 
1.1. Prevalence, course, and comorbidity 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder was previously thought to be relatively rare (e.g. Woodruff 
& Pitts, 1964), although around 80% of the general population experience intrusive, 
unpleasant, unwanted thoughts similar to those seen in OCD (Rachman, & de Silva, 1978; 
Salkovskis, & Harrison, 1984) and more than half the population may engage in ritualized 
behavior (Muris, Merchelback, & Clavan, 1997). However, non-clinical samples report their 
obsessions and compulsion as less severe and distressing. 
Rates for OCD vary slightly in different prevalence studies, but the disorder has been 
documented in different cultures (e.g. Weissman et al., 1994) with a lifetime prevalence rate 
ranging from 0.7% (in Taiwan) to 2.5% (in Puerto Rico). A recent study suggested lifetime 
prevalence rates around 2-3% with no consistent gender differences (Kessler, Berglund, 
Demler, Jin, & Walters, 2005). In USA lifetime prevalence rates have ranged from 1.9% to 
3.3% (Karno, Golding, Sorenson, & Burnam, 1988). When using DSM-III-R criteria in 
Norway, a lifetime prevalence of 1.6% was found in the capitol (Oslo), while lower rates 
(.6%) were observed in a rural area (Kringlen, Torgersen, & Cramer, 2006). The 12 month 
prevalence rates were .7% and .3% respectively for the two sites. Reliability of results 
obtained in such epidemiological studies has in subsequent investigations been questioned 
(e.g. Nelson & Rice, 1997; Stein, Forde, Anderson, & Walker, 1997) and some of the 
differences found in such prevalence studies may also be caused by differences in diagnostic 
criteria used by DSM-III and DSM-IV (Crino, Slade, & Andrews, 2005).  
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Although several epidemiological studies have indicated that OCD is a relatively 
common condition, few studies have reported the prevalence of OCD in clinical settings. One 
study suggested that the disorder was rarely observed in the 19 clinics studied (Fireman, 
Koran, Leventhal, & Jacobson, 2001). This discrepancy with the prevalence data suggest that 
many individuals suffering from OCD are not seeking out treatment, or are not being 
recognized in clinics and given the benefits of empirically documented treatments. However, 
lifetime prevalence estimates in the range of 1% - 3% must be used with caution. If 
adjustments are made for misclassification and instability, it will still be a disorder which 
seems to be rarely recognized in clinics (Fireman et al., 2001). In addition, it often takes 7-10 
years from onset until the diagnosis and treatment has taken place (Nestadt et al., 1994; 
Whitaker et al., 1990). These results are not satisfying when considering that treatment of 
OCD is among the psychological disorders where efficient treatment is thoroughly 
documented (Hofmann & Smits, 2008). 
OCD usually develops in adolescence, but can also occur earlier in childhood. The 
majority of patients develop OCD before 35 years of age (Lo, 1967; Goodwin, 1969), and 
depression and/or anxiety may accompany initial symptoms often in connection with 
precipitating factors such as pregnancy/childbirth and difficult life events. Mean age of onset 
of symptoms is roughly 20 years (e.g. Heyman, Fombonne, Simmons, Ford, Meltzer, & 
Goodman, 2003). The course of the disorder could be quite chronic and fluctuate with levels 
of stress (e.g. Mataix-Cols, Ruach, Baer, et al., 2002; Stewart, Geller, Jenike et al., 2004). A 
longitudinal study lasting 40 years observed remission amongst 20% of the sample and partial 
remission amongst 28% (Skoog & Skoog, 1999). Improvement usually occurred after many 
years with the disorder and the majority of the sample continued to show clinical symptoms.  
Early onset of OCD has been related to greater likelihood of obsessive-compulsive 
spectrum disorders such as tic/Tourette’s disorders (Janowitz et al., 2009), somatoform, eating 
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and impulse-control disorders (de Mathis, do Rasario, Diniz, Torres, Shavitt, Ferrao, et al., 
2008) and possibly obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (Maina, Albert, Salvi, Pessina, 
& Bogetto, 2008). Relationship to other anxiety and mood disorders is less clear. A related 
study (Grant, Mancebo, Pinto, Williams, Eisen, & Rasmussen, 2007), however, found that 
patients with late onset OCD showed less severe obsessions and a trend towards better 
outcome following CBT. However, such late age at onset (after age of 30) was quite rare 
(11.3% of the sample) and the study also found several non-significant differences between 
late and early onset regarding factors such as insight, quality of life, social functioning, and 
comorbidity. 
Comorbidity is common among people with OCD and studies have indicated that 
around 50% have additional diagnoses (e.g. Steketee & Barlow, 2002; Torres, Prince, 
Bebbington et al., 2006). A Turkish study (Tükel, Polat, Ozdemir, Aksüt, Turksöy, 2002) 
found comorbid axis I conditions in 68.7% of their patients with OCD. Affective disorders 
were most prevalent, followed by anxiety disorders such as simple phobias (17.7%), social 
phobia (15.6%), generalized anxiety disorder (12.2%), and panic disorder (9.5%). Such 
comorbid conditions could affect treatment outcome and a Norwegian study (Hansen, Vogel, 
Stiles, & Götestam, 2007) found less improvement for patients with comorbid panic disorder 
or generalized anxiety disorder. Disorders such as body-dysmorphic disorder, 
hypochondriasis, eating disorders, nail-biting, skin-picking and trichotillomania are also 
prevalent in OCD (Bienvenu, Samuels, & Riddle, 2000). Among 113 children and adolescents 
with OCD in Sweden, comorbid conditions were observed in most cases and only one out of 
five patients had OCD as the only diagnosis (Ivarsson, Melin, & Wallin, 2008). The most 
common comorbidity was neuropsychiatric disorders (47%), as well as other anxiety 
disorders (39.8%) and affective disorders (24.8%). Personality disorders are also common 
especially cluster C (dependant, avoidant, and obsessive-compulsive). Around 50% of people 
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with OCD could have a comorbid personality disorder (Steketee & Barlow, 2002) compared 
to the prevalence of 2% in the general population (Torgersen, Kringlen & Cramer, 2001). 
Causes of OCD and other psychological disorders are difficult to establish. Behavioral 
principles have been used to explain the development of OCD and cognitive and 
metacognitive models posit theories concerning the importance of different beliefs. In 
cognitive models early experiences could be understood as making a person vulnerable to 
OCD by developing obsessive beliefs which are then activated following a critical incident. 
Biological research has also found possible factors influencing obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms such as serotonin (e.g. Leckman et al., 2000) and genetic components (for review 
see van Grootheest, Cath, Beekman, & Boomsma, 2005). Certain regions of the brain have 
also been suggested as important in OCD as damage to certain areas correlate with obsessive-
compulsive symptoms (e.g. Machlin, Harris, Pearlson, Hoehn, Saric, Jeffrey & Camargo, 
1991; Whiteside, Port & Abramowitz, 2004) and studies have found increased metabolic 
activity in orbitofrontal cortex and basal ganglia which has been reduced following treatment 
(e.g. Nakatani, Nakgawa, Ohara, Goto, Uozumi, Iwakiri, et al., 2003). However, there is little 
evidence of a specific “OCD-centre” in the brain and there exists no lab test for OCD. 
Although there has been conducted a great deal of research within the medical field in regards 
to biological accounts for OCD a detailed review of this research is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
2. Psychological models of OCD 
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2.1. Cognitive-behavioral models of OCD 
Cognitive behavioral models have dominated the understanding and treatment of OCD. The 
model is a hybrid of a behavioral model and a cognitive model with its focus on obsessive 
beliefs. The cognitive models of OCD have their origins within Beck’s schema theory of 
emotional disorders (Beck, 1976) and view dysfunctional schemas, beliefs, and appraisals as 
core constituents of the disorder. Several recent theories attempting to explain the 
pathogenesis and treatment of OCD emphasize the importance of cognitive factors and the 
debate continues as to which dysfunctional beliefs are most central in OCD. For instance, the 
model proposed by Salkovskis (1985) suggests that the fundamental dysfunctional beliefs 
concern inflated responsibility, while Rachman’s (1997, 1998) cognitive model of obsessions 
places greater emphasis on the personal significance that people with OCD allocate to their 
intrusive thoughts. These cognitive theories have often been termed “appraisal theories”, 
given the significance of the subjective interpretation of intrusions. These theories postulate 
that intrusions can be placed on a dimension of normal cognitive phenomenon and that the 
appraisal is partly derived from more enduring underlying beliefs and determine whether or 
not intrusions develop into clinical obsessions. 
A coordinated effort to develop and evaluate cognitive assessment strategies for OCD 
resulted from a discussion following the World Congress of Behavioral and Cognitive 
Therapies in 1995 (OCCWG, 1997). Sixteen existing instruments assessing different domains 
of beliefs thought to contribute to the development and maintenance of OCD were ranked 
independently in order of importance for OCD. Through this process the Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group identified six belief domains; responsibility, 
perfectionism, tolerance for uncertainty, overestimation of threat, control of thoughts, and 
importance of thoughts. The working group developed two instruments to assess these beliefs 
and to guide future research on cognition in OCD. In accord with these empirically derived 
belief domains and the research direction taken on OCD subtypes, contemporary cognitive 
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therapy approaches have attempted to discover which cognitive beliefs are most relevant for a 
particular individual as well as modifying underlying core beliefs (e.g., Wilhelm & Steketee, 
2006). 
2.1.1. Overinflated responsibility and overestimation of threat. 
 One of the most influential and comprehensive cognitive analyses of OCD was presented by 
Salkovskis (1985, 1989, 1999, 2007). Central in this cognitive model is the faulty appraisal 
that promotes the notion of exaggerated personal responsibility for events that will bring 
harm. The concept of responsibility concerns believing that one has power to bring about or 
prevent negative outcomes. The interpretation of an intrusion based on the belief of 
responsibility (i.e. responsible for harm to oneself or others) will result in emotional 
discomfort and will motivate attempts at neutralization aimed at reducing or avoiding the 
perceived responsibility (Salkovskis, Richards, & Forrester, 1995). 
In a review of the empirical findings regarding Salkovskis’ theory, Clark (2004, p. 
100) concludes that “appraisals/beliefs of responsibility and neutralization, are clearly core 
elements in the persistence of obsessions”. However, Clark (2004) also pointed out that the 
significance of inflated responsibility may be overstated, and that it might be more applicable 
to certain subtypes of OCD. 
Another central belief in OCD concerns the perceived likelihood and cost of aversive 
events (e.g. Foa & Kozak, 1986; Freeston et al., 1996; Salkovskis, 1985). Examples of such 
beliefs could be; "I believe that the world is a dangerous place"; and "bad things are more 
likely to happen to me than to other people”.  Related to overestimation of harm are beliefs 
about coping ability, low tolerance for uncertainty, and low tolerance for anxiety/discomfort. 
Overestimation of threat has, however, been linked with all anxiety disorders (Sookman & 
Pinard, 2002).  
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2.1.2. Perfectionism and tolerance for uncertainty.  
Contemporary cognitive theorists have also suggested a role for perfectionism in the 
understanding of OCD. Several studies have found that perfectionism is related to obsessive-
compulsive symptoms (e.g. Frost & Steketee, 1997; Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; Pleva & 
Wade, 2006; Rheaume, Freeston, Dugas, Letarte & Ladouceur, 1995), also when controlling 
for responsibility and depression (Wu & Cortesi, 2009). However, similarly to that of 
overestimation of threat, studies have failed at demonstrating that perfectionism is specific to 
OCD as compared to other psychiatric disorders (e.g. Frost & Steketee, 1997; Sassaroli et al., 
2008). This observation has been discussed in terms of perfectionism being a necessary trait 
but not a sufficient trait for the development of obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Frost & 
Steketee, 1997). 
Individual with OCD often exhibit pathological doubt concerning properties of 
stimulus, situations, and actions (e.g. Rasmussen & Eisen, 1988; Reed, 1985). Doubts are 
often seen in regards to whether hand washing has been performed and as to whether they 
have forgotten something important. Pathological doubt has been thought to be most evident 
among patients with checking compulsions (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Rasmussen & 
Eisen, 1992), but has also been postulated to play a central role in many other anxiety 
disorders as well as in obsessive-compulsive personality disorder and dependent personality 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Intolerance for uncertainty is often 
observed in people having difficulty making decisions. It seems as if they are more cautious 
and use longer time to categorize objects and wishes for information to be repeated. When a 
decision is made it often involves greater doubt about the correctness of this decision and 
uncertainty, and newness/change is interpreted as potentially dangerous. Difficulties with 
strong affect and the confidence in ability to cope with ambiguous situations may also be 
dimensions of this belief. 
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2.1.3. Importance and control of thoughts.  
The belief that “mere presence of a thought indicates that it is important” (OCCWG, 1997, p. 
678) is the foundation for the importance of thoughts theory, which is largely based on the 
misinterpretation of significance theory developed by Rachman (1997, 1998). The main 
proposition is that catastrophic misinterpretations of importance of one’s thoughts, images, 
and impulses both lead to and contributes to persistence of obsessions. The central premise is 
that normally occurring intrusions are catastrophically misinterpreted in terms of signifying to 
the person that they are “mad, bad, or dangerous” (Rachman, 1997, 1998). Factors such as 
high moral standards, depression, anxiety proneness, and cognitive biases contribute to 
vulnerability when experiencing obsessions and catastrophic misinterpretations. According to 
Rachman (1998), normal unwanted intrusive thoughts will develop into clinical obsessions if 
they are misinterpreted as personally important and threatening, given that the content of the 
intrusions is contrary to the individual’s value system. When this occurs, frequency of the 
obsessions will increase because both internal (i.e. anxiety sensations) and external cues (e.g. 
sharp objects) may be misinterpreted as threatening (i.e. “the terrible physical sensations 
indicate that I could lose my mind and end up hurting myself or others with that knife”) 
instead of neutral. This in turn leads to increased persistence of the obsessions, since 
avoidance and attempts at neutralization will prevent disconfirmation and instead reinforce 
the catastrophic misinterpretation.  
Thought-action fusion (TAF; Rachman, 1997, 1998, 2003), which is conceptualized as 
a cognitive bias (Rachman, 1993; Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996), contributes to 
misinterpretation of significance. This is defined as “a phenomenon in which people tend to 
regard their thoughts as being psychologically equivalent to the corresponding action, and/or 
believe that their thoughts of possible misfortunes actually increase the likelihood that the 
misfortune will occur” (Rachman, 2003, p. 12). Two forms of TAF are considered relevant to 
OCD. Likelihood TAF is the belief that having the thought increases the likelihood that a 
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negative event will happen to oneself or others. The second form is termed as a moral TAF, in 
which the thought is perceived as shameful and having the thought is as bad as committing 
the act. The relationship between TAF and responsibility has been conceptualized in different 
ways (e.g. Rachman, 1993; Shafran et al., 1996; Salkovskis & Forrester, 2002) and may 
require better operational definitions (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). 
Clark (2004) has reviewed the empirical status for Rachman’s hypothesis, and 
concluded that inflated misinterpretations of significance and the TAF bias are empirically 
supported in OCD. However, the extent to which these processes are specific to OCD is still 
uncertain, since there is evidence that they also occur in other forms of anxiety (Clark, 2004; 
Shafran & Rachman, 2004). 
The tendency to overestimate the significance of controlling one’s thoughts, and the 
belief that this is attainable and desirable has been given prominence with the theory 
regarding control of thoughts. This domain is largely based on the cognitive control theory 
developed by Clark and Purdon (1993), and Purdon and Clark (1994). In addition to the 
primary appraisal of intrusions based on importance, threat, and inflated responsibility, the 
model proposes that a faulty secondary appraisal of failed thought control plays an important 
role in OCD. Several features of this secondary misinterpretation contribute to escalation of 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, including misinterpreting failed thought control as highly 
significant and/or as increasing the probability for future threat, believing that it is possible 
and desirable to achieve complete or perfect control, having an inflated sense of 
responsibility, and drawing faulty conclusions about uncontrollability (Clark, 2004). 
Clark (2004) reported that there is only indirect support for some parts of the cognitive 
control theory. However, Tolin and colleagues (2006, 2007) concluded that there is increasing 
evidence indicating that individuals with OCD are characterized by the belief that thought 
control is both necessary and possible, and that these individuals use maladaptive thought 
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control strategies that have a high probability of being unsuccessful. Also, a literature review 
by Moulding and Kyrios (2006) suggested that the interaction or discrepancy between desire 
for control and sense of control over thoughts contribute to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. 
 
2.1.4. Efficacy of cognitive-behavioral treatments for OCD.  
The most effective psychotherapeutic approach for treating OCD is exposure and response 
prevention (ERP), cognitive behavior therapy, and pharmacotherapy with selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (March, Frances, Kahn, & Carpenter, 1997). Evidence for ERP has been 
accumulating over 40 years after its first description by Meyer (1966) in a case series. ERP is 
derived from learning theory and consists of exposure to the anxiety provoking obsessions 
while preventing neutralizing or ritual responses that reduce anxiety. How ERP for OCD 
actually works is more difficult to establish. Different accounts such as reciprocal inhibition, 
counter-conditioning, habituations, extinction, the two-factor model, and network-based 
emotional processing have been suggested as possible mechanisms, but all have experienced 
difficulties when it comes to empirical tests (Tryon, 2005). 
Even though ERP for OCD is thoroughly documented as an efficient treatment, it has 
been associated with a high level of discomfort and seems to require a high degree of 
treatment motivation. This might be one factor explaining the often replicated finding that 25–
30% of the patients suitable for this treatment approach do not want to enter, drop out early, 
or do not comply with it (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989; McDonald, Marks, & Blizared, 1988). 
Among those who comply with the treatment 20% or more do not respond or fail to maintain 
their gains (Foa & Kozak, 1996; Barlow, Allen & Choate, 2004). When using asymptomatic 
criterion as the index of outcome the recovery rate is approximately 25% (Fisher, & Wells, 
2005a). One attempt to improve the overall efficacy of ERP has included adding motivational 
interviewing to increase willingness to commence and comply with ERP (Maltby & Tolin, 
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2005, Simpson, Zuckoff, Page, Franklin, & Foa, 2008). Other attempts have combined ERP 
with pharmacological treatment (e.g. Simpson, Foa, Liebowitz, et al., 2008) and a recent 
interest has been to investigate whether D-Cycloserine can potentiate the effects of ERP (e.g. 
Wilhelm et al., 2008) as it has been shown to facilitate learning and fear extinction (Norberg, 
Krystal, & Tolin, 2008). However, no dramatic improvements have been observed from these 
attempts. 
There has been increasing interest in cognitive processes involved in the etiology of 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. It has been argued that treatment can be improved by 
identifying and modifying maladaptive beliefs and cognitive processes underlying the 
disorder. Devaluation of the importance of within-session habituation has inspired several 
theoretical and empirical contributions to the field aimed at specifying maladaptive appraisals 
underlying the disorder. A number of cognitive theorists have proposed that OCD could be 
conceptualized and treated cognitively and studies on cognitive therapy for OCD started to be 
published in the 1980’s. 
Meta-analyses suggest that ERP and cognitive therapy for OCD are quite equivalent 
and unquestionably efficacious treatments for OCD (e.g. Franklin, & Foa, 2002; Abramowitz, 
1997; van Balkom et al., 1994; Rosa-Alcázar, Sánchez-Meca, Gómez-Conesa, & Marin-
Martinez, 2008). In a number of studies (Abramowitz, Foa, & Franklin, 2003; Marks et al., 
1988; Rachman, & Hodgson, 1980; Foa & Kozak, 1996) approximately 60–80% of the adult 
cases are classified as treatment responders and they often experience around 50% symptom 
reduction (Abramowitz, Franklin, & Foa, 2003). There seems to be small differences between 
ERP and cognitive therapy (Fisher & Wells, 2005a; Freeston et al., 1997) although some 
evidence does exist that attrition rates are lower in cognitive therapy (e.g. Abramowitz, 
Taylor, & McKay, 2005). When using asymptomatic criterion as index of outcome, ERP and 
cognitive therapy have low and equivalent recovery rates of approximately 25% (Fisher, & 
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Wells, 2005a). In Norway, research studies have also documented efficacy of CBT treatment 
both in adults (Vogel, Stiles, & Götestam, 2004) and children/adolescents (Valderhaug, 
Larsson, Götestam, & Piacentini, 2007). A Norwegian survey also suggested that 
cognitive/behavioral, family and medication approaches were preferred over psychodynamic 
and humanistic approaches in the management of OCD in children/adolescents (Valderhaug, 
Götestam, & Larsson, 2004). 
Various methodological issues are problematic in treatment studies of OCD. Many 
studies have used small sample sizes and did not include control conditions to compare the 
efficacy of different treatment approaches. None of the studies have specified the amount of 
cognitive techniques applied, or when to use them for specified intrusions or subtypes. Also, 
different selection methods and control groups have been used throughout the studies. Many 
studies also lack intent to treat analyses. Taken together, these methodological differences 
may limit the generalizability of the results. As these studies employ a wide range of 
cognitive techniques for different obsessive beliefs, it is difficult to assess what interventions 
are important for which problem when using between-group designs. The possibility of 
holding everything constant except for one variable in order to assess its effect is difficult 
with the designs used in the studies reviewed above.  
In cognitive therapy, recent research efforts aimed at increasing treatment efficacy 
have often centered on the content specificity hypothesis. This premise argues that specific 
dysfunctional beliefs underlie and maintain dysfunctional appraisals of intrusions and, in turn 
are associated with particular symptom presentations or subtypes (e.g., Sookman, 
Abramowitz, Calamari, Wilhelm, & McKay, 2005). Matching OCD subtypes with specific 
cognitive strategies could enhance treatment outcome as previous treatment trials have 
typically treated OCD as a homogenous group, thereby ignoring symptom subtypes and 
possible necessary differences in therapeutic focus. Accordingly, attempts to reliably identify 
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particular subtypes of OCD using factor analytic and clustering methods have been 
conducted, but empirical support for a more subtype specific cognitive treatment has yet to be 
adequately demonstrated.  
 
2.1.5. Mediators and mechanisms of change in ERP and CBT for OCD.   
Statistical methods for testing mediator effects have been developed and dramatic progress 
has been made within the neuroscience field which could facilitate further documentation for 
the mechanism of change in successful treatment of OCD. However, research on mediators 
and the mechanism of change in empirically supported treatments for OCD is still in its 
infancy. Within the field of OCD only a few correlational studies exist that investigates the 
relationship between changes in cognitions and changes in symptoms. The studies that have 
been conducted on ERP and CBT for OCD have found significant correlations between 
improvement on cognitive beliefs and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. In a study by 
Emmelkamp, van Oppen, and van Balkom (2002), obsessive-compulsive symptoms and 
obsessive beliefs changed significantly following ERP treatment for a group of OCD patients 
(N = 28). Significant differences in obsessive beliefs were found between treatment 
responders and non-responders. Whittal, Thordarson, and McLean (2005) reported similar 
results for CBT and ERP treatment (N = 54), with a significant correlation between residual 
change scores for obsessive beliefs and OCD symptoms. Whittal and colleagues found that 
cognitive change was associated with symptom improvement, but there were no significant 
differences between the conditions (CBT or ERP) on any of the specific cognitive beliefs and 
appraisals at treatment termination or follow-up. 
There are several limitations to these studies and it is a leap to move from these 
correlational studies to making inferences about the mediating role of cognitions or 
mechanisms of change. Theories have postulated potential mediators (e.g. change in 
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cognitions) for how the therapy should work, but how it actually works has not been 
addressed. Finding mediators is an important first step for establishing mechanisms of change 
in therapy and several criteria should ideally be met. The treatment should be demonstrated to 
bring about outcomes that are better than no treatment or placebo and should have a plausible 
theory attempting to explain how this happens. Then the timeline criteria should be met by 
demonstrating that the mediator (e.g. cognitions or metacognition) actually change before 
symptom change occurs. A further indication of a possible mediator could come from higher 
dosage of treatment leading to better outcome. The studies mentioned above do not meet these 
criteria. Inferences about causes cannot be made due to the correlational nature of the studies, 
the timeline criterion is not addressed appropriately and there is no control for possible 
confounding variables and bidirectional relations. However, these studies are a starting point 
for further research on the mechanism of change in ERP and CBT for OCD.  
Research on the relationship between smoking and lung cancer also started out with 
correlational studies. These were later followed by longitudinal studies suggesting a possible 
causal mechanism. Experimental studies documented further a dosage effect and finally the 
mechanism between smoking and lung cancer was demonstrated to occur through cell 
mutation due to a chemical found in cigarettes. Despite the many flaws of correlational 
research it provides a starting point and raises awareness regarding the need to better 
understand how ERP actually works. For a review on the role of mediators and mechanism of 
change in psychotherapy confer Kazdin (2007). Although no studies on mediators in 
treatment of OCD meet the criteria suggested by Kazdin, there have been such studies based 
on cognitive therapy for other anxiety disorders. For instance, Smits, Rosenfield, McDonald, 
and Telch (2006) found that modifying cognitions concerning high probability of harm 
(similar to overestimation of harm in OCD) led to reductions in fear as observed in patients 
with social anxiety disorder. However, there are very few studies on this topic and Tryon 
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(2005) have highlighted difficulties experienced by behavioral, cognitive, and affective 
accounts and suggested that change could occur simultaneously in these systems.  
Dismantling and finding the critical components of an efficacious treatment would be 
an important step towards discovering mediators and possibly later the mechanism of change. 
The non-significant differences between changes in cognitions for ERP and CBT make it 
difficult to draw strong conclusions about the importance of targeting OCD-specific beliefs 
with cognitive therapy. In addition, it has been a problem that it has not been specified how 
much time was spent on modifying beliefs from the different belief domains or specified what 
the criteria for such selection were. As most CBT studies target several different belief 
domains, without specifying how much time is spent on each, or offer a rational or model for 
how this selection of priority is done, the possibility of replicating these studies or 
generalizing their findings is limited. Since different beliefs domains and cognitive processes 
could be differentially important, it is also possible that such a spread of focus might result in 
suboptimal cognitive therapy according to the content specificity hypothesis.  
Development of disorder specific cognitive models has resulted in effective treatments 
for many anxiety disorders (e.g., Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006). For instance, 
cognitive therapy for panic disorder has improved efficacy rates beyond those achieved by 
purely behavioral interventions (Siev & Chambless, 2007). However, OCD has not witnessed 
comparable improvements (Steketee, Frost, & Wilson, 2002; Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 
2005) and the efficacy rates of both cognitive and behavioral approaches for OCD may have 
reached a plateau where a fresh perspective could be needed (Whittal, Robichaud, 
Thordarson, & McLean, 2008). 
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2.2. The metacognitive model of psychopathology 
In the cognitive models that explain obsessive-compulsive symptoms with constructs such as 
perfectionism/overestimation of harm and responsibility/tolerance of uncertainty it is the 
content of the cognitions which predominate as the core mechanisms. The metacognitive 
model holds a different perspective where cognitive beliefs are understood as by-products of 
metacognitive beliefs. According to the metacognitive model it is the individual's cognitions 
about their own cognitive processes which is the key to understanding the development and 
maintenance of the disorder.  Automatic intrusive thoughts, feelings, or doubts activate meta-
beliefs about the danger and meaning of such events and encompass beliefs about the harmful 
effects of thoughts, the need to control them, and beliefs about the importance of monitoring 
for them and engaging in perseverative coping strategies such as worry and rumination. These 
beliefs influence appraisals of intrusions and responses to them which affect emotional 
reactions. Metacognitive theory implies that treatment should not focus on challenging the 
validity of particular worries and negative thoughts, beliefs about inflated responsibility, 
intolerance of uncertainty or perfectionism as is the case in cognitive therapy.  
The metacognitive model of psychopathology is based on the Self-Regulatory 
Executive Function (S-REF) model (Wells, & Matthews, 1994; 1996). This model described 
the relationship between beliefs that guide regulation of behavior and mental processes, 
controlled processes and automatic processing of internal and external information. 
Metacognition refer to beliefs and knowledge about thinking as well as strategies used to 
regulate and control thinking processes. The origins of metacognition come from 
developmental and educational psychology (Flavell, 1979), where it has long been recognized 
that metacognitions plays a critical role in how people learn and that training in metacognitive 
control can result in more effective learning. This parallels with the goal of facilitating new 
learning in psychological therapy. In metacognitive therapy focus is on modifying inflexible 
self-focused attention, perseverative thinking styles in the form of worry/rumination, 
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attentional strategies of threat monitoring, maladaptive coping behaviors, and the 
metacognitive beliefs that regulate these processes. 
There are three main facets of metacognition; metacognitive knowledge, 
metacognitive experiences, and metacognitive skills/strategies (Flavell, 1979; Wells, 2000). 
Metacognitive knowledge is stored in memory in a declarative form and refers to knowledge 
about cognitive processes. It encompasses beliefs about thoughts and the function of memory, 
perception, and attention. Metacognitive knowledge is modified through a wide range of 
learning experiences and through monitoring of cognition. A person with OCD could develop 
false declarative beliefs about their inability to control their responses to obsessions if he or 
she repeatedly and unsuccessfully uses thought control strategies in an attempt to remove 
obsessions. 
The second facet, metacognitive experiences, includes experiences such as feelings of 
confidence or feelings of knowing (e.g. the tip of the tongue phenomenon). These feeling 
states can be used by the person with OCD as a guide for selecting coping responses and 
assessing the nature of a threat (Wells, 2000). Other aspects of metacognitive experiences 
include the appraisal of thoughts and the nature and degree of awareness a person has over 
their current cognitive processing routines. 
Metacognitive strategies are the final facet concerned with the techniques used to 
regulate and control cognition, and are conceptualized as proceduralized knowledge or plans 
for processing. In OCD, the control strategies used are directed at modifying online 
conceptual processing. This may involve attempting to remove intrusive thoughts from 
consciousness for instance by thought suppression or constructing and focusing on positive 
images. Unfortunately, these metacognitive control strategies tend to intensify and exacerbate 
unwanted metacognitive experiences. The consequence is that it prevents metacognitive 
knowledge from being adaptively modified.  
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The central tenet of the S-REF model is a style of thinking called the cognitive 
attentional syndrome (CAS) which is considered the main causal factor in prolonging 
emotional disorders. The CAS consists of three interacting components. Firstly, perseverative 
thinking is used in the form of worry and rumination and maladaptive attentional strategies 
that focus attention on signs of threat (e.g., intrusive thoughts) and emotional/physiological 
arousal. Secondly, the attention strategy represents another aspect of the individuals plan for 
coping with intrusive thoughts. Monitoring for signs of threat in OCD is metacognitive in 
nature as it is a volitional and effortful strategy designed to regulate cognition. In addition to 
perseverative thinking and attentional strategies, a third component involves 
counterproductive coping (i.e. compulsions), which consists of strategies which disrupt 
regulation of cognition and prevent maladaptive metacognitive knowledge from being 
corrected. The CAS is driven by metacognitive knowledge such as “worry will help me cope” 
and “paying attention to signs of threat keeps me safe” which prevent metacognitive 
knowledge from being modified because they continually refresh the belief that obsessions 
are powerful and significant, rather than being benign cognitive events. 
 
2.2.1. The specific metacognitive model of OCD.  
The metacognitive model of psychopathology could be used as a generic model to treat 
psychological disorders. However, disorder specific models have been developed in order to 
target the metacognitive beliefs which could be more prominent in certain disorders. The 
metacognitive model of OCD proposes that intrusive thoughts activate metacognitive 
knowledge which in turn guides maladaptive processing (the CAS). The metacognitive beliefs 
concern the dangerousness and significance of intrusive thoughts/feelings and are termed 
thought-fusion beliefs. Wells (1997; 2009) proposed three different types of thought-fusion 
beliefs to be important for OCD. Thought-Action Fusion (TAF) involves believing that a 
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thought alone can cause a person to carry out an action, or that a thought is equivalent to an 
action. Thought-Event Fusions (TEF) involves thinking that having a thought can cause 
events. Thought-Object Fusions (TOF) involves the belief that thoughts and feelings can be 
transferred into objects.  
The thought-fusion beliefs can be measured with the Thought Fusion Instrument (TFI, 
Wells, Gwilliam, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2001). Depending upon the strength of these fusion 
beliefs, the intrusions could be appraised as significant and possibly dangerous. According to 
the metacognitive model these fusion beliefs are activated following a trigger (usually an 
automatic thought) and will further give rise to beliefs about rituals. 
Beliefs about rituals are assumptions an individual holds about the need to carry out 
rituals and neutralising behaviour in response to intrusions. These are expressed in a 
declarative form and could either be positive, e.g. “if I keep knives locked in the cupboard I 
will not hurt my children”, or negative, e.g. “my rituals could make me go crazy”. Modulation 
of the level of distress is partially attributable to the person’s metacognitive beliefs about 
rituals and their metacognitive knowledge (typically erroneous), reflecting their ability to 
remove intrusions from consciousness. These beliefs about rituals activate a metacognitive 
plan for reducing the perceived threat, which includes a wide range of overt and covert 
neutralizing strategies as well as perseverative thinking and monitoring for unwanted thoughts 
in an attempt to neutralize threat. The Beliefs About Rituals Inventory (BARI; Wells & 
McNicol, 2004) assesses the strength of such beliefs.  
Rituals and neutralising behaviour are performed until an internal subjective criteria, 
or stop signal, is met (Gwilliam, Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Wells, 2000). The 
metacognitive plan consists of specific internal rules, in conjunction with stop signals that 
determine how the ritual is conducted and when it finishes. The stop signal is often a 
metacognitive experience such as a feeling of knowing or a feeling of satisfaction used by the 
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individual to determine whether it is safe to terminate their neutralizing behavior. Examples 
of such subjective criteria are “having a perfect memory of the action” and “having performed 
the rituals in the correct order”. These stop signals and others have been proposed and 
assessed with the Stop Signals Questionnaire (SSQ; Myers, Fisher & Wells, 2009a).  
 
2.2.2. Empirical documentation for the metacognitive model of OCD.  
Considerable evidence exists that dimensions of metacognition are associated with 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms in both analogue and clinical populations. A number of 
correlational studies have demonstrated that metacognitive beliefs are positively correlated 
with obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) after controlling 
for worry (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998; Sica, Steketee, Ghisi, Chiri, & Francheschini, 2007) 
and depressive symptoms (Emmelkamp & Aardema, 1999).  
A central prediction of the metacognitive model is that the metacognitive beliefs about 
the significance and danger of intrusions is most relevant to understanding the disorder and 
that non-metacognitive beliefs such as responsibility is the result of conceptual processing 
guided by metacognitions. Some empirical studies have supported this prediction. Two cross-
sectional studies (Gwilliam, Wells, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Myers & Wells, 2005) 
examined the relative contribution of metacognition and inflated responsibility to obsessive-
compulsive symptoms. Both inflated responsibility beliefs and metacognition were associated 
with obsessive compulsive symptoms, but when the interrelations between the two constructs 
and worry were controlled, only metacognition, and not inflated responsibility predicted 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. These two studies suggest that inflated responsibility is an 
epiphenomenon of metacognitive beliefs. People with OCD make inflated responsibility 
appraisals, but this could occur as part of the ruminative chain of thoughts activated by 
metacognitive beliefs about the meaning and significance of intrusive thoughts. These studies 
challenged the content specificity hypothesis of cognitive therapy and the view that it is 
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necessary to match OCD subtypes with specific cognitive belief domains. Metacognitive 
beliefs on the other hand could be the same across subtypes (Irak & Tosun, 2008) which could 
suggest that metacognitive therapy could be delivered in a group format despite the patients’ 
considerable heterogeneity. 
Further evidence in support of the importance of metacognitions in OCD came from 
an exploratory factor analysis of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 which obtained four 
factors: (1) perfectionism/uncertainty, (2) importance and control of thoughts, (3) inflated 
responsibility, and (4) overestimation of threat (Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2008). In a series of 
regression analyses the relative contribution of the cognitive beliefs and the metacognitive 
domain of importance and control of thoughts were tested. The analyses controlled for worry 
and overestimation of threat. The major finding was that the metacognitive factor was the 
unique and consistent predictor of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. However, in Wells’ 
model, the metacognitive factors involved in OCD are broader than those defined in the 
importance and control of thoughts subscale of the OBQ-44. Based on the metacognitive 
model it would be more interesting to explore the role of thought-fusions, beliefs about 
rituals, stop signals, and the role of general metacognitive factors such as positive beliefs 
about worry and cognitive confidence. Myers, Fisher, & Wells (2009b) demonstrated for 
instance that a specifically designed metacognitive measure of beliefs about intrusions (the 
thought-fusion instrument) was an independent prospective predictor of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms, whereas the cognitive and metacognitive beliefs indexed by the OBQ were not 
significant.  
Other aspects of the metacognitive model involve low confidence in memory and 
cognitive self-consciousness (CSC) which is the tendency to monitor one’s own cognitive 
processing. CSC is a volitional strategy guided by positive metacognitive beliefs about the 
advantages of examining cognitive activity in relation to intrusive thoughts. Studies have 
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illustrated the relationship between CSC and obsessive-compulsive symptoms (e.g., 
Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Janeck, Calamari, Riemann, & Heffelfinger, 2003) and 
found that CSC differentiated OCD patients from a mixed-anxiety group after controlling for 
general anxiety, depression, and cognitive belief domains. A follow-up study in a large non-
clinical population replicated the above result in that CSC predicted obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms over and above negative interpretations of intrusions and trait anxiety (Cohen & 
Calamari, 2004). Studies have also shown that people with OCD, mainly with the checking 
subtype, have low confidence in their memory abilities (e.g., Hermans, Martens, DeCort, 
Pieters, & Eelen, 2003; Tolin et al., 2001) and that this may be related to heightened CSC. For 
example, Exner et al. (2009) found high CSC mediated episodic memory difficulties in OCD.  
The metacognitive model of OCD specifies that metacognitive beliefs about 
intrusions, beliefs about rituals, and stop signals are central to the maintenance of the disorder. 
Myers, Fisher, and Wells (2009a) found that each of these three metacognitive domains were 
positively related to obsessive-compulsive symptoms and that, as predicted by the model, 
each domain contributed incremental explanatory power. Moreover, this relationship 
remained when non-metacognitive beliefs (perfectionism/certainty and inflated responsibility) 
were controlled. These findings need to be replicated as these constructs have been submitted 
to relatively few empirical tests. 
Although several studies lend support to the predictions of the metacognitive model, 
few treatment studies have tested the efficacy of metacognitive therapy. Fisher & Wells, 
2005b) compared a metacognitive rationale with a habituation rationale when giving brief 
exposure and response prevention. The metacognitive condition showed significantly greater 
reduction in anxiety associated with obsessive thoughts and reduction in metacognitive beliefs 
and in the urge to engage in neutralizing behaviors. Based on these findings they concluded 
that prolonged exposure does not appear to be necessary for belief change. A case series has 
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demonstrated (Fisher, & Wells, 2008) that patients with OCD effectively can be treated with 
MCT, but so far no large open trial or randomized controlled trial have been conducted. In 
summary there is empirical support for the metacognitive model based on cross-sectional 
studies but there is a lack of studies investigating the role of metacognitions in OCD samples 
and there is a lack of treatment studies supporting metacognitive therapy for OCD.  
2.2.3. Differences between the metacognitive model and the cognitive models. 
 It has been argued that cognitive therapy resemble metacognitive therapy since both aim to 
enable patients not to respond to the intrusion, just to let them come and go without 
interference or special attention (e.g., Wilhelm & Steketee, 2006). However, this is at odds 
with the vast majority of treatment strategies and the theoretical basis of cognitive therapy. 
This is deduced from the fact that almost all of the treatment components involve further 
conceptual analysis with the goal of reality testing a range of cognitive beliefs. Also, the 
current interest in developing subtype specific treatments is in line with the content specificity 
hypothesis in cognitive models. The diversity of obsessional content and compulsive behavior 
show much heterogeneity (Feinstein, Fallon, Petkova, & Liebowitz, 2003), but its content or 
choice of compulsive behavior is considered as less important by the metacognitive model 
since the metacognitive beliefs attached should be quite similar irrespective of subtype. 
According to the metacognitive model, therapy should explicitly focus on modifying higher 
order metacognitive processes such as beliefs about the importance and power of thoughts, 
and to enable the patient to develop an adaptive plan for processing obsessional stimuli and 
for guiding subsequent behavior (Wells, 2000). 
The metacognitive perspective focuses on how the cognitive attentional syndrome 
operates in OCD and views the multiple cognitive beliefs as part of the patients’ perseverative 
thinking. The aim of this thinking is understood as an attempt to try and make sense of and to 
cope with their intrusions and emotions. There are similarities between MCT and CBT and 
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these deal with common aspects of therapy such as; assessment followed by an idiosyncratic 
formulation, psycho-education, self-monitoring, socializing to the model, verbal and 
behavioral reattribution strategies used to change beliefs and behaviors, exposure to feared 
stimuli, and relapse prevention interventions are conducted towards the end of treatment. 
However, there are also important differences. MCT does not focus on content of cognitive 
beliefs. Each appraisal is considered to occur as a result of maladaptive processing and occur 
in the context of perseveration as a coping response to the initial intrusion. Therefore, from 
the metacognitive perspective, cognitive therapy is understood as attempting to modify 
content of perseverative thinking rather than the metacognitive processes which perpetuate 
continued maladaptive processing.  
Metacognition is involved with both the control and monitoring of cognition. When 
patients enter treatment, they are typically operating in an object mode which means that they 
respond to their intrusive thoughts as if they were facts. A primary goal of metacognitive 
therapy is to enable patients to shift to a metacognitive mode of processing and enable the 
person to be aware and recognize their thoughts as events in the mind that do not necessarily 
have any power or significance. OCD patients often make distorted appraisals, but that these 
occur in a stream of rumination/ worry. For an individual with checking compulsions the 
cognitive beliefs associated could be:  “I’m unsure as to whether I actually closed the door 
and I must be certain of my decisions” (intolerance of uncertainty), “For me, making a 
mistake is as bad as failing completely” (perfectionism), “Harmful events will happen unless I 
am very careful” (overestimation of threat), and “If my actions could have even a small effect 
on a potential misfortune, I am responsible for the outcome (inflated responsibility). In MCT, 
none of these beliefs are targeted. The main metacognitive belief could be: “thinking I forgot 
to lock the door means it’s the case.” Metacognitive belief about rituals could be: “I need to 
perform my rituals otherwise or I’ll never get rid of the intrusion”, and the stop signal could 
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be “I have to check the door a specific number of times”. The use of rituals is understood as 
an attempt to regulate cognition, not to prevent harm or potential danger. 
In cognitive therapy the therapist has a range of intervention techniques to challenge 
the obsessive beliefs. Cognitions could be labeled as to which cognitive distortion is inherent 
in the appraisal (e.g. black and white thinking) and pie charts can be used to illustrate the 
patient’s estimated probability with more logical estimates. Other methods include double 
standard technique, where the therapist asks the patient if they would judge others in the same 
way, and use downward arrow technique to elicit core beliefs which could be challenged. 
MCT does not include any of these strategies in treatment of OCD. Such strategies are viewed 
as promoting further conceptual processing, similar to worry and rumination, and therefore 
would be contraindicated. MCT employs a range of distinct therapeutic strategies in treatment 
of OCD designed to enable patients to update their metacognitive knowledge and 
metacognitive control strategies to distance patients from their intrusive thoughts and thus 
relate to and experience their thoughts in a more benign manner (Wells, 2000). In practical 
terms, the type of technique used is less important than what belief it intends to challenge and 
according to MCT it should be aimed at modifying metacognitive beliefs. 
As previously mentioned, a challenge in MCT is to enable patients to shift to a 
“metacognitive mode” of experiencing thoughts rather than remaining stuck in “object mode,” 
where thoughts are evaluated as subjective realities that must be controlled. The “antidote” is 
that of detached mindfulness (DM), a central strategy in MCT originally conceptualized by 
Wells & Mathews (1994) and refers to how an individual relates to, and experiences cognitive 
events. It also involves the development of greater executive control over attentional 
strategies and types of thinking. DM is concerned with helping the patient to gain greater 
awareness of metacognitive processing thereby enabling the person to suspend conceptual 
processing. Detachment also consists of the individual experiencing himself/herself as an 
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observer, separate from the intrusive thought. A multitude of methods can be used to facilitate 
detached mindfulness (see Wells, 2005). However, the main goal is for patients to do nothing 
in response to intrusive thoughts or feelings, thereby modifying the cognitive attentional 
syndrome, resulting in minimal perseverative thinking, modification of threat monitoring and 
removal of maladaptive coping responses. For further comparison of CBT and the 
metacognitive approach confer Fisher (2009).  
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3. Research questions 
 
As reviewed in the introduction, ERP and CBT are the most documented psychosocial 
treatments for OCD. Despite their efficacy there exists confusion as to how the treatment 
actually works. ERP was originally developed based upon behavioral principles, but has 
evolved to incorporate a focus on cognition. Cognitive therapies without exposure exercises 
for OCD and one experimental study (Fisher & Wells, 2005b) have raised doubts as to 
whether habituation is really necessary for reduction in symptoms. The experimental study 
showed that reduction in anxiety could be greater when delivering a brief exposure and 
response prevention exercise when accompanied with a metacognitive rationale compared to a 
traditional habituation rationale. Likewise, the cognitive models have suggested that it is 
necessary for patients with OCD to modify their obsessive beliefs during ERP in order for 
symptom relief to take place. 
There is a great need to better understand how improvement following ERP and CBT 
for OCD occurs as this would enable researchers to better understand the nature of OCD and 
allow for designing more effective treatments. Although ERP and CBT for OCD seems to 
work rather well, it is still important to investigate whether these results could be replicated in 
other countries and cultures as well as how much training is needed in order to become 
competent in delivering this treatment. So far there has been one treatment study completed in 
Norway on ERP for adults with OCD. The treatment results from that study were promising, 
but it was also a highly controlled trial using experienced therapists. How the results would be 
when using more inexperienced therapist remains uncertain. Addressing this issue would 
enable the research community to explore translational aspects of ERP for OCD and is 
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important for future projects aimed at evaluating the role of supervision and the cost-
efficiency of ERP. 
 If cross-cultural studies continue to indicate that ERP is an effective treatment for 
OCD and that it is relatively easy to learn, it would be important to proceed with investigating 
what mediates this effect. The cognitive revolution has introduced the importance of 
cognitions and hybrid models grouped together under the umbrella term CBT have 
proliferated. Pure cognitive therapy or integrated with traditional behavioral therapy have 
resulted in improved outcomes for some psychological disorders (e.g. panic disorder and 
social phobia). However, for OCD, the introduction of cognitive therapy has not resulted in 
improved outcomes leading to the question of whether we are challenging the right beliefs? 
The metacognitive model suggests that that the cognitive constructs proposed as 
important in OCD are less relevant and that focus should be shifted to the metacognitive 
factors maintaining the disorder. It is therefore important to explore the validity of the 
metacognitive model compared to the cognitive models. If studies suggest that metacognitions 
are more important than ordinary cognitions in explaining obsessive-compulsive symptoms it 
could be an indication that the reason for the shortcomings of cognitive therapy for OCD are 
due to the model focusing on the wrong beliefs. Furthermore, if cross-sectional studies 
support the validity of the metacognitive model, then the role of metacognitions in OCD 
should be put to further tests in treatment studies for OCD. Change in metacognition should 
be accompanied by change in obsessive-compulsive symptoms. If mediators of ERP for OCD 
could be more accurately identified it could be easier to develop a more effective treatment. In 
addition, if change in metacognition mediates change in obsessive-compulsive symptoms, it 
would be important to investigate whether this finding is replicated across the different 
subtypes of OCD and to find the interventions best suited to modify metacognitive beliefs. 
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In an attempt to clarify these issues, the thesis set fourth four research projects:  
 
1. The aim of the first study was to investigate the efficacy of teaching inexperienced 
psychology students ERP for OCD.  
 
2. The aim of the second study was to conduct an empirical test of the cognitive and 
metacognitive models for obsessive-compulsive symptoms. 
 
3. The aim of the third study was to test the relative importance of changing cognitions 
(responsibility/harm and perfectionism/certainty) and metacognition in ERP treatment 
for OCD.  
 
4. The aim of the fourth study was to explore the OCD construct in Norwegian samples 
and to investigate whether the Norwegian translation of the OCI-R is an adequate 
measure of obsessive-compulsive symptoms and subtypes. 
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4. Method 
 
4.1. Design and sample 
Study I was an open trial with no control group. The study investigated whether inexperienced 
student therapist could efficiently learn ERP for OCD. The therapists consisted of five women 
and five men with a mean age of 22.4 (SD = 1.4) when starting supervision. The students had 
been studying psychology for three semesters and none of them had previous clinical 
experience. They were enrolled in a 5-year long educational program in order to become 
clinical psychologists. Their four supervisors were all male and had some background from 
treatment and research on OCD. The OCD sample consisted of 21 outpatients with a primary 
OCD diagnosis. All but one patient had previously attended professional psychological 
treatment and four had previous inpatient stays. The OCD sample had a mean age of 33.0 (SD 
= 15.2). Thirteen were of female gender. Nine were married or cohabitants. Thirteen were 
currently working or studying. Ten of the patients used medication (SSRI/SNRI). 
 Study II consisted of two studies in which both used cross-sectional design to 
investigate the relationship between cognitions, metacognitions and obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. In the first part of the study a community control sample was recruited through e-
mail lists for introductory psychology students and local government employees. The sample 
consisted of 269 participants of which 70.1% were women. In addition to the community 
control sample, a sample of people suffering from OCD was recruited. The OCD sample 
consisted of participants at a university clinic for adults specializing in OCD treatment. The 
OCD sample consisted of 57 participants with a mean age of 31 (SD = 11.7). The majority of 
the sample was of female gender (59.6%). In the second part of study II, a total of 304 
community controls were recruited. The participants were recruited through e-mail lists from 
the most popular classes at the university (philosophy, psychology, medicine, and physics). 
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66.4% of the sample were of female gender. In the sample, 54.4% were single, and the 
remaining were cohabitant/married. The majority of the sample were students (75.7%), while 
20.4% were in full-time jobs, and the remaining participants had either part-time work, 
disability, or were retired. 
In study III changes in cognitions and metacognitions were investigated as predictors 
of treatment outcome for 83 outpatients with OCD who had completed ERP. The sample had 
a mean age of 34.2 (SD = 11.9), and the majority were female (71.1%). About half of the 
sample used SSRIs and the sample had suffered from OCD for a mean of 14.4 (SD = 11.5) 
years. Comorbid conditions were present; 37.3% had depressive disorders, 21.7% had social 
anxiety disorder, 18.1% had generalized anxiety disorder, and 18.1% suffered from 
panic/agoraphobia. 
In study IV a cross-sectional design was employed in order to investigate the 
psychometric properties of the OCI-R. Two samples, one clinical OCD sample and one 
student/community control sample, were recruited. The control sample consisted of 1167 
participants (436 were high school students) with a mean age of 22.5 (SD = 7.9). The majority 
of the sample was of female gender (62.4%). The OCD sample consisted of 72 participants 
with a mean age of 32.2 (SD = 12.5, range 16-66) and the majority of the sample was of 
female gender (N = 44). 
 
4.2. Measures 
 
4.2.1. Clinical interviews.  
The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV, Brown, DiNardo, & 
Barlow, 1994) was used as a diagnostic interview in all four studies. The structured Clinical 
Interview for the DSM-IV on axis I (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1995) was used as a 
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diagnostic interview for some patients in study I, III and IV. The SCID has different modules 
covering mood episodes, psychotic symptoms, psychotic disorders; mood disorders, substance 
use disorders; and anxiety, adjustment, and other disorders. In addition, study IV used the 
Clinical interview for DSM-IV axis II Personality (Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1990) 
as a measure of personality disorders.  
The Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989a; 
1989b) was used in all studies. The interview has been used as a measure of obsessive-
compulsive severity. Five obsession and five compulsion items are assessed on 0 - 4 point 
ratings in regards to frequency, distress, interference, resistance, and control. Studies have 
indicated adequate psychometric properties (Goodman et al., 1989a; Woody, Steketee, & 
Chambless, 1995). 
 
4.2.2. Self-report measures.  
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990) was used as a measure of anxiety 
symptoms in study IV. BAI is a 21-item self-report questionnaire measuring common 
symptoms of clinical anxiety. Each symptom is rated on a four-point scale, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of anxiety symptoms. BAI has shown good psychometric properties 
(Beck & Steer, 1990). 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) was used as a 
measured of depressive symptoms in study I, III, and IV. BDI is a 21-item self-report 
inventory, which has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of syndrome depression 
severity in both clinical and non-clinical populations (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). Each 
symptom is rated on a four-point scale where higher scores indicate higher levels of 
depressive symptoms. 
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Beliefs about rituals inventory (BARI; Wells & McNicol, 2004) was used as a 
metacognitive measure in study II. Beliefs about rituals inventory assesses beliefs about 
compulsions and consists of 14 items. Each items is rated on a 1 (disagree) to 4 (agree very 
much) scale. One example of an item is “I need to do my rituals or else I will be punished”. 
12 of the items in the questionnaire assess positive beliefs about rituals and two items reflect 
negative beliefs about rituals. 
Metacognition Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) was 
used as a measure of metacognitive beliefs in study III. MCQ-30 is a 30-item self-report scale 
measuring beliefs about thinking. Responses are required on a four-point scale ranging from 1 
(do not agree) to 4 (agree very much). A five-factor structure exists: (1) positive beliefs about 
worry; (2) negative beliefs about the controllability of thoughts and corresponding danger; (3) 
cognitive confidence; (4) negative beliefs about thoughts in general/need to control thoughts; 
and (5) cognitive self-consciousness. High scores reflect more reported problems with the 
item in question (e.g. a high cognitive confidence score indicates less trust in one’s memory). 
Appropriate psychometric properties have been reported (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). 
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group, OCCWG, 2005) has been used as a measure of cognitive beliefs relevant in 
OCD in study I, II, and III. OBQ-44 assesses belief domains that have been proposed to be 
important in the etiology of OCD. There are 44 items, all rated on a 7 point scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). OBQ-44 has been found to show good internal 
consistency and criterion-related validity in both clinical and non-clinical samples (OCCWG, 
2005). OBQ-44 is a measure which is designed specifically to measure cognitions in OCD. 
The three subscales are: (1) responsibility/threat, referring to the belief that one is obligated to 
prevent negative events due to exaggerated beliefs in the likelihood of harm occurring; (2) 
perfectionism/certainty, referring to intolerance of imperfection and mistakes; and (3) 
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importance/control of thoughts, referring to the belief that the mere occurrence of thoughts 
implies that they are meaningful and dangerous and that these thoughts should be controlled. 
The importance/control of thoughts subscale has been labelled as a ‘‘metacognitive’’ 
construct in the original paper on the OBQ (Obsessive Compulsive Cognition Working 
Group, 1997) with reference to the work of Clark & Purdon (1993).  
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) was used as a 
measure of obsessive-compulsive symptoms in study I and II. The scale consists of six 
subscales with three items on each subscale. The six dimensions are obsessing, washing, 
checking, neutralizing, ordering, and hoarding. Eighteen items are rated on a 0 (not at all 
distressing/bothering) to 4 (extremely distressing/bothering) scale. Examples of items include 
"I feel I have to repeat certain numbers" (neutralizing) and "I frequently get nasty thoughts 
and have difficulty in getting rid of them" (obsessing). Several studies have indicated the 
OCI-R to be a good measure of obsessive-compulsive symptoms (e.g. Abramowitz & Deacon, 
2006; Foa et al. 2002; Hajcak, Huppert, Simons, & Foa, 2004; Huppert et al. 2007).  
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990) 
was used as a measure of worry in study II and IV. PSWQ includes 16 items that are rated 
from 1 (not at all typical of me/not descriptive) to 5 (very typical of me/very descriptive) as 
to how typical the statement (e.g. “My worries overwhelm me” and “I am always worrying 
about something”) is for them. PSWQ assesses the intensity, frequency, and uncontrollability 
of worry in general without referring to specific topics. Appropriate psychometric properties 
have been described (Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & Borcovec, 1994). 
Stop Signals Questionnaire (SSQ, Myers et al., 2009a) was used as a metacognitive 
construct in study II. SSQ is developed to capture the importance of certain stop criteria in 
deciding to stop carrying out rituals. The items are constructed based on a list of unhelpful 
stop signals prevalent in OCD patients as found in case-material (Myers et al., 2009). The 
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questionnaire consists of 12 items and respondents are asked to rate how important each of 
these signals are for stopping their rituals on a 5 point scale from 0 (not at all important) to 5 
(extremely important). All items begin with “An important signal of when I can stop my 
rituals is when...” and one example of an item is “... I have replaced the intrusive thought 
with a positive image”. 
Thought-Fusion Instrument (TFI; Wells, Gwilliam, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2001) was 
used as a measure of the metacognitive construct of thought-fusion in study II. TFI assess 
metacognitive beliefs about the meaning, significance, and danger of intrusive thoughts. It 
was designed to measure the three types of thought fusions implicated in the metacognitive 
model: Thought-Action Fusion (e.g., “If I have thoughts about harming someone I will act 
on them”), Thought-Event Fusion (e.g., “My thoughts alone have the power to change the 
course of events”) and Thought-Object Fusion (e.g., “My feelings can be transferred into 
objects”). TFI consist of 14 items rated on a 0 to 100 scale. Gwilliam et al. (2004) obtained 
acceptable reliability and preliminary evidence supports its convergent and discriminant 
validity. 
Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Self-Report (Y-BOCSSR; Baer, Brown-
Beasley, Score & Henriques, 1993) was used in study II. The self-report version of the Y-
BOCS rates the severity of symptoms in patients with OCD. Y-BOCSSR contains a total of 
10 items where the first five items measures severity of obsessions and the last five quantify 
the severity of compulsions. Each item is scored on a 5 point scale from 0 (no distress) to 4 
(extreme distress). Five items are assessed for both obsessions and compulsions: frequency, 
control, resistance, interference and distress. Studies have documented adequate 
psychometric properties (Grabill et al. 2008; Steketee, Frost and Bogart, 1996).  
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4.3. Treatments 
Participants included in this thesis who underwent psychotherapy were recruited from a group 
therapy project for OCD and from individual ERP treatments conducted at outpatient clinics. 
The therapists included graduate psychology students (study I), psychologists, and 
psychiatrists.  
The group therapy used groups led by a psychologist and a psychiatrist with six 
participants. The groups met once a week for a total of twelve 2.5 hour long sessions. The 
group treatment was adapted from a manual developed by Krone, Himle, & Nesse (1991). In 
addition to ERP, every group therapy session included the presentation of a topic that was 
relevant to the treatment of OCD (e.g. the nature of OCD, principles of behaviour therapy, 
family life, and lifestyle). Other interventions included the use of workbooks (with 
information about OCD, space for taking notes and forms to document daily compliance and 
progress), attempts at externalizing the OCD (e.g. ‘‘OCD is a bully, let’s fight back’’), and the 
use of coping statements (e.g. ‘‘it’s not me it’s my OCD’’). There was no adherence measure 
for the group therapy, but supervision by one of the developers of the manual was given and 
the detailed protocol was not deviated from. 
The individual treatments used in this thesis were based on a commonly used 
treatment manual for obsessive-compulsive disorder (Kozak & Foa, 1997). The majority of 
the individual treatments used ERP with no extra cognitive techniques. However, some of the 
individual treatments included cognitive techniques such as Socratic questioning, pie-charts, 
and cognitive restructuring. The individual treatments used 90-min sessions which were 
delivered twice a week. The main ingredients of the therapy were for the first session to 
formulate a case-conceptualization, presenting a habituation rationale, and self-registration of 
rituals for homework. Session 2 involved creating the exposure hierarchy and introducing 
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rules for ritual prevention. The following sessions were similar in structure and consisted 
mainly of checking homework assignments, 60 minutes with in vivo and imaginary exposure 
delivered in a sequence specified by the hierarchy (reaching the top of the hierarchy after six 
sessions with exposure), and agreeing on homework assignments. Focus turned to relapse 
prevention when treatment was approaching termination. 
 
4.4. Statistics 
In study IV, effect sizes were calculated for ADIS-IV ratings, OCI-R, and BDI and clinical 
significant change analyses were estimated for the treatment completers. In study II, effect 
sizes were used in order to explore the differences among the two samples in regards to 
metacognitive beliefs and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Pearson correlations were 
calculated in order to investigate the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
and the two metacognitive constructs of thought-fusion beliefs and beliefs about rituals. In the 
second part of the study, correlations were computed for the metacognitive beliefs (including 
the third construct of stop signals), non-metacognitive beliefs, obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms and worry. Two hierarchical regressions were computed with either the OCI-R or 
the Y-BOCSSR as the dependent variable. PSWQ was entered on Step 1 to control for worry, 
followed by threat (from the OBQ-44), non-metacognitive beliefs (responsibility and 
perfectionism from the OBQ-44), and then the metacognitive measures were entered on 
separate steps with the order of entry based on their theorised causal sequence of activation, 
with thought fusion (TFI) on Step 4, belief about rituals (BARI) on Step 5, and stop signals 
(SSQ) on Step 6. 
In study III, effect sizes of treatment effect were calculated for comparisons with other 
studies. Furthermore, the proportion of patients achieving clinically significant change, 
improving, and showing no change according to the criteria of Fisher & Wells (2005a) was 
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estimated. Comparisons of treatment responders’ and non-responders’ change scores on 
obsessive beliefs and metacognitions were calculated using independent t-tests. These 
analyses were followed by correlational analyses to investigate the relationship between 
changes in symptoms and changes in beliefs. Regression analyses were then used to predict 
outcome using pre-treatment levels of obsessive–compulsive symptoms on step 1, changes in 
depressed mood on the second step, before entering change scores in the non-metacognitive 
beliefs measured by the OBQ-44 on step 3. For the last step we investigated the influence of 
the metacognitive variables. In the fourth and final step the change score for the MCQ-30 was 
entered along with changes in the importance/control of thoughts subscale of the OBQ-44 
since it was originally described as a metacognitive construct. Finally, correlation coefficients 
for post-treatment and follow-up results were calculated for the obsessive–compulsive 
symptoms, cognitive beliefs, and metacognitive beliefs in order to assess the stability of the 
results. 
In study IV, the proposed factor structure of the OCI-R was tested using confirmatory 
factor analysis on the control sample. Reliability of the OCI-R was tested with Cronbach’s 
alpha and intercorrelations. Validity of the OCI-R was then further explored from different 
perspectives. Firstly, comparisons of the OCD sample and the student control sample were 
analyzed using t-tests and effect sizes. In addition, further exploration of the six factors as 
predictors of obsessive-compulsive severity was investigated using regression analysis that 
controlled for worry. Relationship between subtypes of OCD (as assessed with the structured 
clinical interview) and their corresponding subscale on the OCI-R were then investigated 
using effect-size calculations. The relationship between the OCI-R and obsessive-compulsive 
severity, worry, anxiety, and depression were finally explored using correlational analyses 
combining participants from the control sample and the OCD sample. 
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5. Results 
 
In study I, entitled “The efficacy of teaching psychology students exposure and response 
prevention for obsessive-compulsive disorder”, the effect sizes following treatment were large 
as measured with a diagnostic interview and the OCI-R. The results indicated that 65% of the 
treatment completers achieved clinical significant change at post-treatment and the results at 
follow-up were encouraging. The treatment was conceived of as credible and strong working 
alliances were achieved. 
The theoretical basis of cognitive and metacognitive accounts of OCD was empirically 
explored in study II, entitled “An empirical test of the metacognitive model of obsessive-
compulsive symptoms: replication and extension”. The study found that metacognitive beliefs 
of thought fusion and beliefs about rituals correlated significantly with obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. Also, the OCD sample scored higher on these metacognitive measures compared 
with the control sample adding to the validity of metacognitions in OCD. Thought-fusion and 
belief about rituals were found to be predictors of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Stop 
signals correlated significantly with obsessive-compulsive symptoms, but they were not a 
predictor. The cognitive factor of responsibility/harm was not a significant predictor when 
controlling for metacognitions, while the results for perfectionism/certainty were more 
ambiguous. 
According to the metacognitive model psychological treatment should function 
through changing maladaptive metacognitions. Whether or not changes in metacogntion could 
mediate symptom change in ERP for OCD was explored in study III, entitled “Change in 
metacognitions predicts outcome in obsessive–compulsive disorder patients undergoing 
treatment with exposure and response prevention”. The ERP treatment delivered was effective 
and commensurate with other trials of ERP for OCD. Metacognitive beliefs and beliefs 
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concerning perfectionism/certainty and responsibility/harm decreased significantly during the 
course of treatment. The correlations between changes in the OBQ-44 and changes in 
obsessive–compulsive symptoms were similar to that of previous research (e.g., Whittal et al., 
2005). Patients who made clinically significant change, but not those that were simply 
improved or made no change, had significantly lower post-treatment scores on metacognition. 
Change on the MCQ-30 explained a large proportion of the variance in obsessive–compulsive 
symptoms. Change in metacognition was a better predictor of outcome symptom levels than 
change in beliefs about responsibility/harm and perfectionism/certainty. When the overlap 
between predictors was controlled for, only metacognition was significant. Further analyses 
showed that during treatment, change in two dimensions of metacognition independently 
predicted posttreatment symptom severity. These were beliefs about the need to control 
thoughts and positive beliefs about the need to worry. 
Further investigation of the relationship between metacognitions and subtypes of OCD 
is now possible since study IV, entitled “Norwegian version of the Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory-Revised: Psychometric properties”, confirmed a six-factor structure of the OCI-R. 
Cronbach’s alpha values and the intercorrelations of the subscales were similar to that of 
previous studies and suggested acceptable reliability. OCI-R scores could significantly 
differentiate the OCD sample from the control sample. All OCI-R subscales except for 
hoarding were significant predictors of obsessive-compulsive severity. Strongest relationship 
was found with another measure of obsessive-compulsive severity (the Y-BOCS), and as 
expected, significant and positive correlations were observed for measures of worry, anxiety, 
and depression. 
 
6. Conclusions 
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ERP has been the treatment of choice for OCD for several decades. Despite this fact, little is 
known about the teachability of ERP to inexperienced therapists and there is a debate 
concerning whether patients in Norway actually are offered this treatment. The first aim of 
this thesis was therefore to investigate whether inexperienced psychology students in Norway 
could become competent ERP therapists when given appropriate supervision. The results 
indicated that ERP is an empirically supported treatment of OCD that can be relatively easy 
learned by inexperienced therapist. 
 Despite the efficacy of ERP and CBT for OCD there is still confusion as to how the 
treatment works. The second aim of the thesis was therefore to investigate to different 
theoretical accounts of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. The relative contribution of 
cognitions and metacognitions was investigated. The results indicated that metacognitions 
could be more important than ordinary cognitions in explaining obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. The results supported the validity of the metacognitive model of OCD. 
 Given the empirical evidence suggesting the importance of metacognitions in OCD the 
third aim of the thesis was to further investigate the validity of the cognitive models and the 
metacognitive model in a treatment study for patients with OCD. The results indicated that 
ERP for OCD could be mediated by change in metacognition and provides further indication 
for the validity of the metacognitive model. 
 In summary the thesis has provided further documentation for the efficacy of ERP and 
suggested that it could be mediated by change in metacognition. The thesis provides further 
support for the validity of the metacognitive model of OCD. However, a future challenge 
includes investigating whether this finding would be replicated independent of subtype of 
OCD. This could now be analyzed using the OCI-R as a measure of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms and subtypes.  
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7. Discussion 
 
7.1. Strengths and limitations 
In general this thesis’ main strength is that it tests theoretical predictions from two different 
theoretical models of OCD that are empirically supported. Further strengths include good 
treatment results which were obtained when using ERP for OCD making the findings 
clinically relevant, issues of supervision and dissemination of ERP for OCD were addressed, 
and psychometrically adequate measures were employed. However, the thesis also has several 
limitations such as limited description of treatment fidelity, issues concerning small sample 
size, lack of control groups and randomization, there is no empirical test of metacognitive 
therapy, group- and individual treatment are collapsed together, and several measures have 
yet to be validated in Norway. More specific strengths and limitations of the four individual 
papers included are described below. 
The major strength of study I is that it demonstrates that it is relatively easy to acquire 
competency in delivering ERP for OCD. The positive treatment results achieved justifies 
investigating whether these results are replicable in other university clinics as well as other 
professional clinics. We consider it a positive finding for patients, practitioners, and clinical 
researchers that relatively inexperienced students can learn efficient treatment quickly. The 
main conclusion from this trial is that students are able to apply ERP treatment successfully to 
OCD when given appropriate supervision.  
Due to different limitations of this study several questions remain unanswered. The 
study had a small sample size, lacked a control group, as well as the fact that our two 
diagnostic assessors also supervised the students. However, use of self-report measures 
supplemented the results. Finally, five patients did not meet for follow-up assessment, leaving 
the results from follow-up analysis difficult to interpret. One of the unanswered questions is 
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whether ongoing group supervision is essential due to lack of a control group. Little is known 
concerning how much training and supervision is needed to achieve certain levels of 
efficiency. The students used in our study could also be an unrepresentative group. However, 
they represented half of their class, indicating that they are probably not that different from 
other students enrolled in the same program. Our study is unable to answer whether these 
students will be better therapists in the future compared to their classmates who did not 
receive this training. In general these positive treatment results introduce a challenge to 
metacognitive therapy for OCD. ERP for OCD seems relatively easily translated into different 
setting while the effort needed to become an efficient metacognitive therapist is uncharted 
territory. 
The major strength of study II is that it replicated results of a previous study (Myers et 
al., 2009) thereby further strengthening the empirical support for the metacognitive model of 
OCD. In doing so the results indicated a potential clinical use of these results may be reflected 
in metacognitive therapy for OCD (Wells 1997, 2000). Study II had several limitations. It had 
a cross-sectional design which means conclusions about causation cannot be made. In 
addition the questionnaires were not randomly ordered due to the software program used, 
which could subject the results to be affected by potential order effects. 
The major strength of study III is that it is the first of its kind to indicate that ERP for 
OCD could be mediated by change in metacognition. In study III, it was found that good 
response to exposure and response prevention treatment is associated with reduction in 
metacognition which is a new original finding. Findings are consistent with the metacognitive 
model of OCD and the emphasis it gives on focusing on modification of metacognition in 
treatment. The design did not allow issues concerning the causal relationship between 
metacognitive belief change and symptom improvement during treatment to be addressed. 
Taken together with related research on metacognition and OCD, it seems reasonable to 
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assume on the basis of these data that metacognition could probably contribute to OCD and 
that changing them may be instrumental in recovery. Study III suffers from the same 
problems as the studies reviewed in the introduction regarding the relationship between 
changes in cognition and treatment outcome. The design of the study does not allow for 
inferences concerning mediators and mechanism of change to be drawn. However, the study 
represents an important first step towards revealing this mechanism. Its strength lies in its use 
of plausible theories and the use of multiple measures of possible mediators set in a treatment 
study. Despite this, the study suffers from the timeline problem, the need for multiple 
assessments (preferably from session to session or within session measures). In addition, more 
studies are needed to investigate whether the finding will be replicated and studies attempting 
to manipulate these possible mediators are needed. The study might also be improved by 
including multiple measures of obsessive–compulsive symptoms. Inclusion of other self-
report measures of obsessionality or distress could possibly lead to different results. However, 
Y-BOCS is the gold-standard for measuring obsessive–compulsive symptoms and it covers 
all different subtypes of OCD. Also, Y-BOCS showed meaningful correlations with the 
cognitive and metacognitive measures suggesting that it is a reasonable measure for the 
purposes of our study. 
 Among the strengths of study IV are the sample size and the fact that the study is the 
first of its kind in Norway to adequately assess psychometric properties of a measure designed 
to assess obsessive-compulsive symptoms. The Norwegian OCI-R has shown initial evidence 
of sound psychometric properties making it a suitable measure of obsessive-compulsive 
severity and different subtypes of OCD. It seems to be an appropriate measure for use in both 
clinical settings and in research projects for OCD related problems with Norwegian samples. 
In general the OCI-R seems to capture the obsessive-compulsive construct in meaningful 
ways. Its validity was further strengthened with study IV replicating previous results of the 
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factor structure and correlates with obsessive-compulsive related measures. There were some 
limitations to the psychometric study. The factor analysis was conducted using only the 
control sample. Whether or not the six factor structure is replicated in an OCD sample 
remains unanswered. A larger OCD sample (also including hoarding patients) could also have 
allowed for cut-off scores to be calculated. Also no other clinical group for comparison was 
included. In regards to the subscale-subtype relationships sample size is again a potential 
problem making it questionable to conclude in regards to the OCI-R’s ability to capture 
specific dimensions of OCD. A final limitation could be that it was difficult to assess how the 
OCI-R subscales predict obsessive-compulsive severity using a clinical sample, due to the 
sample size and missing data on measures of worry/anxiety.  
 
7.2. Suggestions for further research 
A comparison of cognitive-behavioral therapy and metacognitive therapy for OCD would 
provide useful information and a randomized controlled trial or at least a large open trial 
should be conducted. Despite this thesis yielding empirical support for the metacognitive 
model, it has not tested metacognitive therapy. Another important aspect of evaluating the 
model involves dissemination research in order to address whether metacognitive therapy is 
applicable when used in clinics and how much training is needed in order to become a skillful 
metacognitive therapist.  
It is also recommended that the temporal relationship between cognitive/metacognitive 
change and symptom change is repeatedly assessed to investigate if symptom change is 
mediated by beliefs and cognitive/metacognitive processes using multilevel analyses, and that 
multiple baseline studies are applied to study the relative importance of the cognitive, 
metacognitive, and the behavioral elements of CBT. In order to further test the metacognitive 
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model of OCD, more and larger prospective studies are encouraged to further investigating 
the causal mechanism involved in the development of obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  
Preliminary results have indicated that metacognitions are important in OCD. 
However the metacognitive profile shouldn’t necessarily be different depending on subtypes 
of OCD. The cognitive model on the other hand has exerted a great deal of effort towards 
findings specific beliefs for subtypes. With the Norwegian OCI-R it is now possible to 
address the issues of subtypes. Further research is also needed as to how the metacognitive 
model applies to other groups with OCD (e.g. children, adolescents, geriatric, and people with 
different cultural backgrounds). 
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1. Introduction
Cognitivemodels of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) share
the assumption that individuals’ appraisals of intrusions, and their
response to this appraisal contribute to the disorder. They differ
though as to which beliefs and unique processes they consider
important in the development and persistence of the disorder. Two
of the belief domains that have been proposed as playing a central
role in the disorder are inﬂated responsibility and perfectionism.
Responsibility is elaborated in a model proposed by Salkovskis
(1985) in which people with OCD perceive an intrusive thought as
evidence that they may be responsible for harm (to self or others) if
they do not take preventive action. These responsibility appraisals
trigger emotional responses that motivate the need to carry out
compulsive acts or rituals. These acts/rituals contribute to main-
tenance of the disorder as it reduces the subjectively perceived level
of responsibility and therefore become reinforced. In a review, Clark
(2004) concluded that responsibility is important in the persistence
ofobsessions, butmaybeoverstated in regard toall subtypesofOCD.
In addition to responsibility, contemporary cognitive theorists
have also suggested a role for perfectionism in the understanding
of OCD. Several studies on non-clinical populations have found that
perfectionism is related to obsessive-compulsive symptoms
(Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; Pleva & Wade, 2006; Rhe`aume,
Freeston, Dugas, Letarte, & Ladouceur, 1995), even when control-
ling for responsibility and depression (Wu & Cortesi, 2009). Frost
and Steketee (1997) also found a relationship between OCD and
perfectionism when using a clinical sample. However, they found
that perfectionism was not speciﬁc to OCD as compared to other
psychiatric disorders, a ﬁnding in agreement with Sassaroli et al.
(2008). It has been proposed that perfectionismmay be a necessary
but insufﬁcient trait for development of obsessive-compulsive
symptomatology (Frost & Steketee, 1997).
In models of OCD which stress constructs such as perfectionism
and responsibility cognitive beliefs play a central role. The
metacognitive model of OCD (Wells, 1997; Wells & Matthews,
1994)has adifferentperspective.Metacognitions refer tobeliefs and
knowledge about thinking as well as strategies used to regulate and
control thinking processes (Flavell, 1979). According to Wells’
metacognitive model it is individuals’ cognitions about their own
cognitive processes and metacognitive regulatory strategies which
are the key to understanding the development and maintenance of
OCD.Wells (1997)proposed that cognitivebeliefs areby-productsof
metacognition and thatmetacognitive beliefs aremore important in
contributing to obsessive-compulsive symptomatology. This model
emphasizes three types of metacognitive knowledge: thought-
fusion beliefs, beliefs about the need to perform rituals, and stop
signals or criteria for terminating rituals.
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In the metacognitive model interpretation of an intrusion
depends upon the activation of thought-fusion beliefs. Wells
(1997) proposed three different types of thought-fusion beliefs.
Thought-Action Fusion involves believing that a thought alone can
cause a person to carry out an action, or that a thought is equivalent
to an action. Thought-Event Fusion involves thinking that having a
thought can cause events, while Thought-Object Fusion is the
belief that thoughts and feelings can be transferred into objects.
The Thought-Fusion Instrument (TFI; Wells, Gwilliam, & Cart-
wright-Hatton, 2001) measures these metacognitive beliefs.
Depending upon the strength of these fusion beliefs, intrusions
are appraised as signiﬁcant and possibly dangerous. For example,
having thoughts that one might hurt one’s children becomes
threatening if one believes having such thoughts will make it
happen. According to the metacognitive model these fusion beliefs
are activated following a trigger (usually an automatic thought/
intrusion) leading to negative appraisals which in turn activate
beliefs about rituals.
Beliefs about rituals refer to assumptions an individual holds
about the need to carry out rituals and neutralizing behavior in
response to intrusions. For example a person may believe ‘‘if I keep
knives locked in the cupboard I will not hurt my children.’’ The
Beliefs About Rituals Inventory (BARI; Wells & McNicol, 2004)
assesses strengthof suchbeliefs. Thesebeliefs also consist of ideas of
not being able to relax or have peace ofmind if one is hindered from
performing the ritual, the idea that something important will be
forgotten, or there will be loss of thought-control, etc. Rituals and
neutralizing behavior are performed until an internal subjective
criteria, or stop signal, is met (Wells, 2000). Examples of such
subjective criteria are ‘‘having a perfect memory of the action’’ or
‘‘having performed the rituals in the correct order.’’ These stop
signalshavebeenassessedbya recentpreliminarymeasure the Stop
Signals Questionnaire (SSQ; Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2009a).
Thought-Action Fusion was a term introduced by Rachman
(1993) to label the cognitive distortions linked to inﬂated
responsibility appraisals. The Thought-Action Fusion scale (Sha-
fran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996) has received attention from
several researchers as reviewed by Shafran and Rachman (2004).
The Thought-Action Fusion addressed deals with experiences such
as thinking that having an intrusive thought increases the
likelihood that adverse events will occur to oneself or others,
and amoral aspectwhere intrusive thoughts are almost considered
as equivalent to acting out the thought. In contrast to this view of
Thought-Action Fusion, the metacognitive model of OCD assesses
thought-fusion differently (e.g., introduces Thought-Object Fusion
and clearly distinguishes Thought-Event Fusion from Thought-
Action Fusion). Furthermore, these are seen as metacognitive
beliefs rather than cognitive distortions. In addition, the relation-
ship between exaggerated responsibility and thought-fusion is
more clearly stated where responsibility is viewed as the content
and product of ruminative chains of thoughts activated by
metacognitions.
Several studies have supported the relationship between
metacognitive beliefs and obsessive-compulsive symptoms, and
these results have held after controlling for worry, depressive
symptoms, responsibility, and perfectionism. A detailed review of
this research was recently presented by Fisher (2009). Cross-
sectional studies based on self-report (e.g., Myers & Wells, 2005)
have demonstrated positive relationships between speciﬁc meta-
cognitive beliefs and obsessive-compulsive symptoms, with little
or no additional contribution made by non-metacognitive belief
domains measured. Experimental manipulations (e.g., Fisher &
Wells, 2005) and prospective studies (e.g., Myers, Fisher, & Wells,
2009b) ofmetacognitive beliefs, provide support for the causal role
of metacognitions implicated in the model. In addition, treatment
data consisting of a case-series study of metacognitive therapy
(Fisher & Wells, 2008), group treatment studies (e.g., Rees & van
Koesveld, 2008), and a study showing that change in metacogni-
tions predicts treatment outcome following exposure and
response prevention treatment (Solem, Ha˚land, Vogel, Hansen, &
Wells, 2009) have added to the accumulating evidence in support
of the metacognitive model. However, a randomized controlled
trial on the effect of metacognitive therapy for OCD has yet to be
conducted. Furthermore, there are aspects of the model that
remain to be tested consistently. In particular, contribution of
beliefs about rituals and subjective stop criteria used to control
neutralizing. Although preliminary results support their role in
obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Myers et al., 2009a; Wahl,
Salkovskis, & Cotter, 2008) their additional contribution alongside
beliefs about intrusions requires further substantiation.
One study, by Myers et al. (2009a) investigated if fusion beliefs,
beliefs about rituals, and stop signals could explain additional
variance in obsessive-compulsive symptoms in their theorized
causal sequence (fusion beliefs! beliefs about rituals! stop
signals). This sequence is derived from Wells (1997) model of
OCD, which states that thought-fusion beliefs are activated
following the occurrence of intrusions. This process leads the
intrusion to be appraised as dangerous or important. When such
occurs it is the individual’s beliefs about rituals which guide
responses to the appraisal. The response ﬁrst involves declarative
beliefs about the need to carry out rituals and ﬁnally the plan for
monitoring and controlling the compulsive behavior which
includes criteria for when to stop.
The study byMyers et al. (2009a) used a sample of 238 students
(mean age 21.8 yrs) enrolled in a variety of courses at the
University of Manchester. For the regression analyses the study
controlled for worry on step 1, overestimation of threat on step 2,
and ordinary cognitive beliefs such as responsibility and perfec-
tionism/certainty on step 3, before entering the metacognitive
variables on steps 4, 5, and 6. Each of the metacognitive steps
explained positively signiﬁcant additional variance in two
measures of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. However, unlike
metacognitions, ordinary cognitive beliefs such as perfectionism/
certainty and responsibility were not signiﬁcant predictors of
obsessive-compulsive symptoms in the ﬁnal step of the equation.
Beliefs about rituals and stop signals were signiﬁcant predictors
when their shared variance was controlled. Thought-fusion beliefs
were also signiﬁcant when using the Obsessive Compulsive
Inventory (Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998), but not
when using the Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Self-
Report (Baer, Brown-Beasley, Score, & Henriques, 1993).
1.1. Aims of the current study
The aim of our current study was to further explore the role of
metacognitions in obsessive-compulsive symptoms (using both
control samples and a clinical sample) and also to explore if the
results obtained in the study by Myers et al. (2009a) would be
replicated in a Norwegian sample. To test themetacognitivemodel
of OCD, three hypotheses were examined:
1. Metacognitions will show a signiﬁcant positive correlation
with obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
2. Patients with OCD will score signiﬁcantly higher on
metacognitive constructs compared to community controls.
3. Metacognitions will continue to explain additional variance
in obsessive-compulsive symptoms even when simulta-
neously controlling for worry, threat, responsibility, and
perfectionism/certainty.
In order to investigate these hypotheses, two studies were
conducted. Study I investigated the ﬁrst two hypotheses using a
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within and between group design. An OCD sample and a
community sample completed self report measures of obses-
sive-compulsive symptoms and measures of metacognitive beliefs
about intrusions and rituals. In study II, the aim was to assess
whether the three fundamental components of the metacognitive
model of OCD, namely, fusion beliefs, beliefs about rituals and
stops signals would predict obsessive-compulsive symptoms
when the effects of worry, threat, responsibility, and perfection-
ism/certainty were controlled. This is a replication of the Myers
et al. (2009a) study and is a cornerstone of the scientiﬁc process.
Replications using samples from different countries and languages
reduce probability that systematic but unknown differences
account for the outcomes.
2. Method
2.1. Participants and procedure
A community control sample was recruited through e-mail lists
for introductory psychology students and from a separate group
consisting of local government employees at the department for
urban development. The questionnaires assessing obsessive-
compulsive symptoms and aspects of the metacognitive model
of OCD were administered using an internet survey yielding no
missing items. The questionnaires were not administered in a
random fashion because the software program did not allow this.
The ﬁnal sample consisted of 269 participants of which 69.9%
(N = 188) were female. The mean age for the sample was 30.04
(12.21). A total of 782 psychology students and 70 local
government employees were asked to participate giving a
response rate of 36.1%.
In addition to the community control sample, a sample of
people suffering from OCD was recruited. The OCD sample
consisted of participants who had been offered exposure and
response prevention treatment for OCD at a university clinic for
adults. The primary inclusion criterion was a primary diagnosis of
obsessive-compulsive disorder. The Anxiety Disorder Interview
Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994)
interview was used for diagnostic assessment by trained
independent raters. The exclusion criteria for the treatment study
were the presence of psychotic disorders, suicidality, develop-
mental or autism disorders, and drug/alcohol dependence. The
OCD sample completed the same questionnaires as the control
sample, as well as the Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale
interview, before starting treatment. The OCD sample consisted of
57 participantswith amean age of 30.96 (SD = 11.73). Themajority
of the sample was female (59.6%, N = 34).
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al.,
2002)
The OCI-R was used as the measure of obsessive-compulsive
symptoms. Eighteen items are rated on a 0 (not at all distressing/
bothering) to 4 (extremely distressing/bothering) scale. Examples
of items include ‘‘I feel I have to repeat certain numbers’’ (from the
neutralizing subscale) and ‘‘I frequently get nasty thoughts and
have difﬁculty in getting rid of them’’ (from the obsessing
subscale). The scale consists of six subscales. Several studies have
indicated the OCI-R to be a good measure of obsessive-compulsive
symptoms (e.g., Abramowitz & Deacon, 2006; Foa et al., 2002;
Hajcak, Huppert, Simons, & Foa, 2004; Huppert et al., 2007).
Compared to the original OCI the OCI-R has fewer items and
according to Foa et al. (2002) it improves the OCI by removing the
redundant frequency scale and reduces overlap between subscales.
Cronbach’s alpha for the total scale in the control sample was .83
and .74 in the OCD sample. For the individual subscales the alpha
values ranged from .54 (neutralizing) to .84 in the control sample
and from .80 to .90 in the OCD sample.
2.2.2. The Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale interview
(Y–BOCS)
Y–BOCS (Goodman, Price, Ramussen, Mazure, & Delgado, 1989;
Goodman, Price, Ramussen, Mazure, & Fleischmann, 1989) was
used as a measure of obsessive compulsive severity in the OCD
sample in addition to the OCI-R. Five obsession and ﬁve
compulsion items are assessed on 0–4 ratings of frequency,
control, resistance, interference, and distress. Only the total scores
were used in our study. Cronbach’s alpha for the total scalewas .83.
2.2.3. The Thought-Fusion Instrument (TFI; Wells et al., 2001)
The TFI assess metacognitive beliefs about the meaning,
signiﬁcance, and danger of intrusive thoughts. It was designed
to measure the three types of thought-fusion implicated in the
metacognitive model: Thought-Action Fusion (e.g., ‘‘If I have
thoughts about harming someone I will act on them’’), Thought-
Event Fusion (e.g., ‘‘My thoughts alone have the power to change
the course of events’’) and Thought-Object Fusion (e.g., ‘‘My
feelings can be transferred into objects’’). The TFI consist of 14
items rated on a 0–100 scale. Gwilliam,Wells, & Cartwright-Hatton
(2004) obtained acceptable reliability and preliminary evidence
supporting its convergent and discriminant validity. Cronbach’s
alpha was .88 in the control sample and .89 in the OCD sample.
2.2.4. The Beliefs About Rituals Inventory (BARI; Wells & McNicol,
2004)
The Beliefs About Rituals Inventory assesses beliefs about
compulsions and consists of 14 items. Each items is rated on a 1
(disagree) to 4 (agree very much) scale. One example of an item is
‘‘I need to do my rituals or else I will be punished’’. 12 of the items
in the questionnaire assess positive beliefs about rituals. The
current study uses the total score of these 12 questions as in the
study by Myers et al. (2009a). The two items reﬂecting negative
beliefs about rituals are therefore not included. These two items
measure the uncontrollability of rituals and asks how dangerous or
harmful they are perceived to be. Test–retest reliability after 3
months has shown a coefﬁcient of .70 (Myers et al., 2009a). The
Cronbach’s alpha for the questionnaire as obtained in our study
was .82 in the control sample and .86 in the OCD sample.
2.3. Overview of data analysis
Means and standard deviations for the different question-
naires were calculated in order to allow comparison with
previous research and to compare the OCD sample with the
community control sample. Effect sizes were used in order to
explore the differences among the two samples in regards to
metacognitive beliefs and obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
Pearson correlations were calculated in order to investigate the
relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptoms and the
two metacognitive constructs of thought-fusion beliefs and
beliefs about rituals.
3. Results
3.1. Means, standard deviations, and sample comparisons
Means and standard deviations on the predictor and outcome
measures for the samples are presented in Table 1. Independent
samples t-tests showed that the OCD group endorsed higher total
symptom scores and subscale scores apart from hoarding on
which there was no statistical group difference. The OCD group
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had signiﬁcantly higher scores on fusion beliefs and beliefs
about rituals. The effect size for these variables was very large
(.86 and 2.10).
3.2. Correlation between obsessive-compulsive symptoms and
metacognitions
In the control sample, the TFI and the BARI showed strong and
signiﬁcant correlations with the total OCI-R score. The metacog-
nitive constructs also showed signiﬁcant correlations with all the
OCI-R subscales. For the TFI these correlations ranged from .24
(washing) to .52 (obsessing). For the BARI the correlations with the
OCI-R subscales ranged from .30 (hoarding) to .54 (ordering).
The strength of the correlations showed a similar pattern in the
OCD sample. The OCI-R total score showed a strong correlation
with the BARI and the TFI. The BARI and the TFI also showed
signiﬁcant correlations with obsessive-compulsive severity as
measured with the Y–BOCS. In the non-clinical sample all
subscales of the OCI-R correlated signiﬁcantly with metacogni-
tions. However, in the clinical sample there were non-signiﬁcant
correlations between washing and hoarding and metacognitions,
and the TFI was not signiﬁcantly correlated with checking. In the
OCD sample the BARI and the TFI showed an intercorrelation of .68,
while in the control sample the correlation was .59. When
combining the two samples into amixed sample the strength of the
correlations increased but the relationship between hoarding and
beliefs about rituals was non-signiﬁcant. The correlations between
obsessive-compulsive symptoms and the two metacognitive
constructs are summarized in Table 2.
In addition to the correlational analyses two regression
analyses were conducted in order to investigate how much
variance in obsessive-compulsive symptoms is explained by these
twometacognitive constructs.When predicting the OCI-R scores in
the control sample using a regression analysis and entering scores
on the TFI on step 1 and the BARI on step 2, both metacognitive
constructs were signiﬁcant predictors and the adjusted R2 of the
model was .52. Thought-fusion belief was signiﬁcant on the ﬁrst
step [B = .025, SD = .002, b = .576, t (1, 267) = 11.517, p < .0001]
and beliefs about rituals was signiﬁcant on step 2 [B = 1.164,
SD = .112, b = .546, t (2, 266) = 10.401, p < .0001]. The same
analysis on the OCD sample gave an adjusted R2 of .42.
Thought-fusion belief on the ﬁrst step was signiﬁcant [B = .020,
SD = .004, b = .531, t (1, 55) = 4.649, p < .0001] and beliefs about
rituals was signiﬁcant on the second step [B = .756, SD = .193,
b = .545, t (2, 54) = 3.921, p < .001].
4. Introduction
In study II, the aim was to conduct a more stringent test of the
metacognitive model by including the third main component of the
model, i.e.; the role of stop signals in addition to fusion beliefs and
beliefs about rituals. We also explored whether these three aspects
of the metacognitive model of OCDwould continue to be predictive
of obsessive-compulsive symptoms once a range of other belief
domains (such as responsibility, perfectionism, worry, and threat)
associatedwithOCD inothermodelswere controlled. It is important
to control for worry as it overlaps with obsessive-compulsive
symptoms (e.g., Tallis & de Silva, 1992) and is implicated in some
beliefs linked with OCD (e.g., Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997).
Similarly, overestimation of threat has been linked with all anxiety
disorders (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). Therefore, by controlling for
these variables it is possible to assess the contribution of beliefs
implicated in speciﬁc theories of obsessive-compulsive symptoms,
over and above worry and threat beliefs.
5. Method
5.1. Participants and procedure
In the second study a total of 304 community controls were
recruited. The participants were recruited through e-mail lists
from the most popular classes at the university (philosophy,
psychology [not the same classes as in study I], medicine, and
physics). In addition, some psychology students who were helping
with recruiting participants also invited their friends and family
members to take part in the survey. Of the 304 participants, 202
(66.4%) were female. In the sample, 54.4% were single, and the
remaining were married or cohabiting. The majority of the sample
was students (75.7%), while 20.4% were in full-time jobs, and the
remaining participants had either part-time work, disability, or
were retired. The response rate for study II was uncertain due to
the fact that several of the e-mail lists did not disclose the total
number of students enrolled.
All questionnaires were completed online by the participants.
The OCI-R and the Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Self-
Report (Y–BOCSSR, Baer et al., 1993) were used as measures of
symptom severity. The Y–BOCSSR was not included for one of the
e-mail lists that were targeted, resulting in 98 students less for this
measure. Metacognitions were assessed by administrating the TFI,
the BARI and the SSQ. To control for worry and cognitive
constructs, the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer,
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) the Obsessive Belief Ques-
tionnaire-44 (OBQ-44; OCCWG, 2005) were included. In contrast
to the study by Myers et al. (2009a) the questionnaires were not
ordered randomly (due to the computer software), but were
presented to the participants in the following order: OCI-R, BARI,
TFI, SSQ, Y–BOCSSR, OBQ-44, and the PSWQ.
Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and effect sizes comparing the OCD group with the
control group on obsessive-compulsive symptoms and metacognitions (study I).
OCD (N=57) Controls (N=269) t d
M SD M SD
OCI-R total 30.12 10.50 9.77 6.37 14.10a 2.34
Washing 5.02 4.24 .67 1.28 7.68a 1.39
Obsessing 8.19 2.82 1.72 1.92 16.50a 2.68
Hoarding 2.19 2.68 2.73 1.99 1.44 .23
Ordering 4.60 3.88 2.16 2.03 4.61a .79
Checking 6.04 3.68 1.89 1.66 8.32a 1.45
Neutralizing 4.09 4.08 .60 1.22 6.40a 1.16
TFI 316.13 274.04 125.81 148.18 5.09a .86
BARI 26.32 7.57 14.22 2.99 11.88a 2.10
Note. BARI =Beliefs About Rituals Inventory; TFI = Thought-Fusion Instrument; OCI-
R =Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised.
a p< .00001, two-tailed.
Table 2
Correlations between obsessive-compulsive symptoms and metacognitions in the
OCD sample, the control sample, and the mixed sample (study I).
OCD (N=57) Controls (N=269) Mixed (N=326)
BARI TFI BARI TFI BARI TFI
Y–BOCS .48** .37** – –
OCI-R total .65** .53** .70** .58** .85** .63**
Washing .19ns .14ns .30** .24** .58** .36**
Obsessing .49** .49** .52** .52** .78** .59**
Hoarding .07ns .18ns .30** .31** .06ns .21**
Ordering .43** .38** .54** .38** .56** .46**
Checking .32* .09ns .45** .29** .64** .37**
Neutralizing .40** .34* .50** .39** .65** .48**
Note. BARI =Beliefs About Rituals Inventory; TFI = Thought-Fusion Instrument; Y–
BOCS=Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale; OCI-R=Obsessive Compulsive
Inventory-Revised; ns=not signiﬁcant.
* p< .05.
** p< .01 (two-tailed).
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5.2. Measures
The OCI-R, the TFI, and the BARI which have already been
described in study I were included. The Cronbach’s alpha in study II
for the OCI-R was .87, while for the TFI and the BARI it was .86 and
.84 respectively.
5.2.1. The Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Self-Report
(Y–BOCSSR; Baer et al., 1993)
This scale rates the severity of symptoms in patients with OCD.
The Y–BOCSSR contains a total of 10 items where the ﬁrst ﬁve
items measure severity of obsessions and the last ﬁve quantify
the severity of compulsions. Each item is scored on a 5 point scale
from 0 (no distress) to 4 (extreme distress). Five items are
assessed for both obsessions and compulsions: frequency,
control, resistance, interference and distress. The current study
used the total score. Steketee, Frost, & Bogart (1996) found that
the self report version of the Y–BOCS has very good internal
consistency and test–retest reliability. Grabill et al. (2008) also
report good internal consistency, test–retest reliability and
adequate validity for the Y–BOCSSR. The Cronbach’s alpha for
the total scale was .90.
5.2.2. The Penn StateWorry Questionnaire (PSWQ, Meyer et al., 1990)
PSWQ assesses the intensity, frequency, and uncontrollability
of worry in general without referring to speciﬁc topics. It consists
of 16 items that are rated on a 5 point scale from 0 (not descriptive)
to 4 (very descriptive). An example of an item is ‘‘I am always
worrying about something’’. The psychometric properties of the
PSWQ have shown acceptable reliability and validity (Molina &
Borkovec, 1994). The Cronbach’s alpha value was .94.
5.2.3. The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44; Obsessive
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, OCCWG, 2005)
OBQ-44 assesses belief domains that have been proposed to be
important in the etiology of OCD. There are 44 items, all rated on a
7 point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The
OCCWG found the OBQ-44 had a three factor solution (OCCWG,
2005). However, subsequent analyses have found this factor
structure did not ﬁt. Myers, Fisher, & Wells (2008) conducted an
exploratory factor analysis and found four factors: perfectionism/
certainty (e.g., ‘‘For me, things are not right if they are not
perfect’’), importance/control of thoughts (e.g., ‘‘Having nasty
thoughts means I am a terrible person’’), responsibility (e.g., ‘‘For
me, not preventing harm is as bad as causing harm’’), and
overestimation of threat (e.g., ‘‘Even ordinary experiences in my
life are full of risk’’). In order to compare the ﬁndings with the
study by Myers et al. (2009a) we used this 4-factor solution. As in
that study the current study did not use the importance/ control of
thoughts variable as it is in essence a generic metacognitive
variable and overlaps with the more speciﬁc metacognitive
questionnaires used in the current study. The Cronbach alpha
values were .83 for responsibility, .91 for perfectionism/certainty,
and .84 for threat.
5.2.4. The Stop Signals Questionnaire (SSQ; Myers et al., 2009a)
The SSQ was developed to capture the importance of certain
stop criteria in deciding to stop carrying out rituals. The items are
constructed based on a list of unhelpful stop signals prevalent in
OCD patients as found in case-material. The questionnaire consists
of 12 items and respondents are asked to rate how important each
of these signals are for stopping their rituals on a 5 point scale from
0 (not at all important) to 4 (extremely important). All items begin
with ‘‘An important signal of when I can stop my rituals is when
. . .’’ and one example of an item is ‘‘I have replaced the intrusive
thought with a positive image.’’ Test–retest reliability for the SSQ
after 3 months has been shown to be acceptable with a coefﬁcient
of .62 and the internal consistency for the questionnaire seems
good (Myers et al., 2009a). The Cronbach’s alpha was .89.
5.3. Overview of data analysis
Correlations were computed for the metacognitive beliefs
(including the third construct of stop signals), non-metacogni-
tive beliefs, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, worry, and threat.
Two hierarchical regressions were computed with either the
OCI-R or the Y–BOCS as the dependent variable. In the
regressions the PSWQ was entered on step 1 to control for
worry, followed by threat (from the OBQ-44) to control for this
general belief which plays a role in all anxiety disorders
(Sookman & Pinard, 2002). Non-metacognitive beliefs (respon-
sibility and perfectionism/certainty from the OBQ-44) were
entered on the next step. The metacognitive measures were then
entered on separate steps with the order of entry based on their
theorized temporal sequence of activation, with thought-fusion
(TFI) on step 4, belief about rituals (BARI) on step 5, and stop
signals (SSQ) on step 6.
As to be expected, when using student/community control
samples and measures of pathology, the variables showed
considerable skewness and they were therefore submitted to
transformation according to the recommendations by Tabachnick
& Fidell (2006), which improved the distribution among scores. All
variables were transformed using square root transformation,
except for the BARI which was subjected to a reciprocal
transformation.
6. Results
6.1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations
Mean scores on symptoms and beliefs for the sample used in
study II and their intercorrelations are shown in Table 3. All the
measures were signiﬁcantly intercorrelated. The correlation
between the metacognitive measures was low enough (.50–.61)
to suggest that each is measuring a different construct. All beliefs
were signiﬁcantly and positively associated with obsessive-
compulsive symptoms.
As often found in OCD research, the correlation between the
OCI-R and the Y–BOCSSR was moderate-strong (r = .59). All
cognitive and metacognitive variables correlated with the OCI-R
ranging from .50 (responsibility) to .61 (BARI). For the Y–BOCSSR
the correlations ranged from .36 (TFI) to .60 (BARI). Worry and
threat showed a consistent relationship with obsessive-compul-
sive symptoms.
6.2. Regression analyses
In predicting symptoms as measured by the OCI-R (N = 304) a
signiﬁcant incremental change was found for all steps except for
stop-signals on the sixth and ﬁnal step. In the ﬁnal step of the
equation when all of the predictors were entered, worry,
perfectionism/certainty, thought-fusion, and belief about rituals
were signiﬁcant independent predictors of obsessive-compulsive
symptoms. The model’s ﬁnal adjusted R2 was .52 (compared with
.63 in the original study).
With the Y–BOCSSR as the dependent variable (N = 206), worry,
threat, and beliefs about rituals signiﬁcantly contributed, while the
cognitive factors, and one of the metacognitive factors (the SSQ)
did not. The metacognitive factor TFI made a contribution that
approached signiﬁcance (p = .059). In the ﬁnal step of the equation
worry and beliefs about rituals were the only independent
signiﬁcant predictors. The ﬁnal model’s adjusted R2 was .40
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(compared with .39 in the original study). A summary of these two
regression analyses is shown in Table 4.
7. Discussion
Two studies were carried out to test hypotheses arising from
the metacognitive model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (Wells,
1997, 2000). Consistent with themodel the ﬁrst study showed that
the metacognitive beliefs of thought-fusion and beliefs about
rituals correlated signiﬁcantly and positively with obsessive
compulsive symptoms. The control samples used in study I and
II showed scores whichwere slightly lower compared to the values
obtained in the study byMyers et al. (2009a). Our results suggested
less variance in symptoms and beliefs which could possibly affect
the results due to a restriction of range in the scores. However,
intercorrelations were similar and comparable, and the strength of
the correlations showed a similar pattern in both the OCD sample
and control sample. The metacognitive constructs also showed
signiﬁcant positive correlations with the different OCI-R subscales.
However, some of the OCI-R subscales did not reach a signiﬁcant
level in the OCD sample (washing and hoarding) which could be
due to the sample size and restriction of range especially for the
hoarding subscale. In the control sample metacognitive beliefs
correlated with all subscales.
In addition to the correlations indicating a signiﬁcant relation-
shipbetweenobsessive-compulsive symptomsandmetacognitions,
the metacognitive measures differentiated between the OCD group
and the control group adding to the validity of the metacognitions
assessed as discriminatory factors. Constructs which separated the
OCD samplemost fromthe control samplewas theOCI-R total score,
the obsessing subscale, and beliefs about rituals.
Fusion beliefs and beliefs about rituals were predictors of
obsessive-compulsive symptoms when entered together in a
regression and they explained a large amount of variance (adjusted
R2 values ranged from .42 to .52) in obsessive-compulsive
symptoms. This study supports the role of metacognitive beliefs
in OCD.
Study II used a different non-clinical sample and included an
additional metacognitive measure, stop signals, a measure of
worry, and a measure of non-metacognitive beliefs as measured
by the OBQ-44. This study was a replication of the analysis
conducted by Myers et al. (2009a) and aimed to examine
whether metacognitive measures would explain additional
variance in obsessive-compulsive symptoms when controlling
for worry and cognitive beliefs linked to OCD. Two measures of
obsessive-compulsive symptoms were used as the dependant
variables in separate equations and the different metacognitive
beliefs were entered based on their hypothesized causal
sequence. Fusion beliefs and beliefs about rituals contributed
incrementally to the variance explained in the OCI-R above
worry and the three factors of the OBQ-44. When the Y–BOCSR
was used as the outcome variable fusion beliefs made a
Table 3
Intercorrelations between OBQ-44 cognitive factors, metacognitions, worry, and obsessive-compulsive symptoms (study II).
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 M (SD)
1 OCI-R (N=304) .59 .52 .56 .50 .57 .55 .61 .51 9.18 (7.83)
2 Y–BOCSSR (N=206) .47 .45 .38 .40 .36 .60 .47 3.27 (4.74)
3 PSWQ .54 .41 .56 .41 .49 .43 45.35 (14.33)
4 OBQ-threat .67 .68 .54 .56 .51 15.37 (8.02)
5 OBQ-responsibility .66 .44 .46 .43 24.57 (9.57)
6 OBQ-Perf./Certainty .43 .54 .51 47.71 (20.02)
7 TFI .50 .51 150.74 (160.64)
8 BARI .61 15.18 (4.02)
9 SSQ 8.97 (8.31)
Note. OCI-R=Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised; Y–BOCSSR=Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Self Report; PSWQ=Penn State Worry Questionnaire;
OBQ=Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44; TFI = Thought-Fusion Instrument; BARI =Beliefs About Rituals Inventory; SSQ=Stop Signals Questionnaire. All correlations are
signiﬁcant at .00001 (two-tailed). Bonferonni corrected p= .001.
Table 4
Predictors of obsessive-compulsive symptoms (study II).
Incremental change Final step of the equation
F cha p R2 cha B SE B b t p
Dependent variable OCI-R total score (N=304)
Step 1—PSWQ 109.05 .000 .27 .16 .06 .14 2.63 .009
Step 2—Threat 53.86 .000 .11 .04 .08 .03 .48 .635
Step 3 11.71 .000 .05
Responsibility .10 .07 .08 1.33 .184
Perf./Certainty .15 .06 .17 2.66 .008
Step 4—TFI 32.53 .000 .06 .04 .01 .22 4.24 .000
Step 5—BARI 28.61 .000 .05 24.24 5.11 .27 4.74 .000
Step 6—SSQ .55 .459 .00 .03 .04 .04 .74 .459
Dependent variable Y–BOCSSR total score (N=206)
Step 1—PSWQ 56.68 .000 .22 .30 .09 .23 3.36 .001
Step 2—Threat 18.93 .000 .07 .12 .12 .09 1.00 .320
Step 3 .69 .503 .01
Responsibility .05 .10 .04 .48 .633
Perf./Certainty .13 .08 .14 1.53 .128
Step 4—TFI 3.60 .059 .01 .00 .01 .02 .27 .791
Step 5—BARI 37.69 .000 .11 41.18 7.85 .41 5.25 .000
Step 6—SSQ 2.56 .111 .01 .10 .06 .12 1.60 .111
Note. OCI-R=Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised; Y–BOCSSR=Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Self Report; PSWQ=Penn State Worry Questionnaire; OBQ-
44=Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44; TFI = Thought-Fusion Instrument; BARI =Beliefs About Rituals Inventory; SSQ=Stop Signals Questionnaire; Perf./Certainty = -
Perfectionism/Certainty.
S. Solem et al. / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 24 (2010) 79–8684
contribution bordering on signiﬁcance (p = .059) and beliefs
about rituals were signiﬁcant. In both equations stop signals did
not contribute on their step.
There were some differences as to the role of thought-fusion
and perfectionism/certainty when using either the Y–BOCSSR or
the OCI-R as the dependent variable in the regression analyses.
The signiﬁcant role of thought-fusion and perfectionism/cer-
tainty was clearer when the OCI-R was used as the measure of
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Research on the relationship
between the interview version of the Y–BOCS and the OCI-R have
shown correlations ranging from .41 to .53 (e.g., Abramowitz &
Deacon, 2006; Foa et al., 2002) despite the fact that both measure
obsessive-compulsive distress. These moderate correlations
could be due to the fact that the Y–BOCS gives a general
indication of severity of all types of obsessive-compulsive
complaints, while the OCI-R differentiates between different
subtypes of the disorder. As a consequence, a personwithwashing
compulsions could get a relatively lowOCI-R total score as long as
no other obsessive-compulsive symptoms are present, but his or
her Y–BOCS score could still be high due to the distress caused by
the washing rituals. As a result, the OCI-R usually has larger
standard deviations than the Y–BOCS (e.g., Abramowitz &Deacon,
2006; Go¨nner, Leonhart, & Ecker, 2008). These differences in
measurement could explain the slightly different results obtained
as well as the differences in the total amount of variance
explainedwhen dealingwith non-clinical sampleswith restricted
levels of symptoms.
The results show that the two key metacognitive constructs of
fusion beliefs and beliefs about rituals contribute to obsessive-
compulsive symptom scores. In the ﬁnal equations metacognitive
variables made independent contributions but other belief
domains did not, apart from perfectionism/certainty.
Failure of the stop signals measure to make a contribution
might be best explained in terms of the overlap between this
measure and the measure of beliefs about rituals. This is an issue
both conceptually and pragmatically. In the metacognitive model
stop signals and beliefs about rituals are part of the same
knowledge about coping strategies, they are part of a plan for
guiding processing and action. It is therefore difﬁcult to separate
them. In the present study these measures were highly correlated
(.61) suggesting they may assess components of a singular
construct. Furthermore, examination of the items of the BARI
(e.g., ‘‘I need to perform my rituals otherwise: I will never have
peace ofmind’’) shows that thismeasure incorporates implicit stop
signals (having peace of mind). Therefore, the lack of additional
contribution may be due to substantive overlap between these
constructs at the conceptual and/or measurement level. However,
Myers et al. (2009a) did ﬁnd that stop signals made an additional
contribution. A possible explanation for the different ﬁndings
could be that the original study had more variance in obsessive-
compulsive symptoms than the current study and that stop signals
come in to play with higher symptom levels. Comparisons of the
samples showed effect sizes (d) that ranged from .17 to .60 for the
different beliefs and symptom measures. In summary, the results
support the role of metacognition in OCD but suggest further
research is needed into the additional contribution of stop signals.
As in the Myers et al. (2009a) study responsibility did not emerge
as an independent predictor in the regressions. However, unlike
that study perfectionism/certainty was an independent predictor
of overall obsessive-compulsive symptoms in the two regressions
with the OCI-R.
The metacognitive constructs added 11–13% extra variance
after controlling for worry, threat, responsibility/harm, and
perfectionism/certainty. These results provide additional support
for a role of metacognitive beliefs in understanding obsessive-
compulsive symptoms.
7.1. Limitations
The ﬁrst limitation was that the studies employed cross-
sectional designs which mean conclusions about causation cannot
be made. Prospective studies are needed to test the direction of
causation. However, a recent prospective study supported
thought-fusion as a predictor of obsessive-compulsive symptoms
(Myers et al., 2009b). Second, the questionnaires were not
randomly ordered due to the software program used, which could
mean the results are affected by order effects. Third, although a
clinical sample was used in the ﬁrst study a number of analyses
were carried out on non-clinical samples. However, obsessive-
compulsive symptoms are likely to exist on a continuum of
severity (Gibbs, 1996) and could therefore be analogous to clinical
samples. Fourth, the response rate was 36.1% for study I and
uncertain for study II. This could raise questions regarding the
representativeness of the samples although a response rate of
36.1% is considered low but acceptable (Babbie, 2004) and
comparable to other studies.
7.2. Conclusions
Findings of the current study provide further support for the
metacognitive model of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. The
potential clinical use of these results may be reﬂected in research
on metacognitive therapy for OCD (Wells, 1997, 2009) which aims
to challenge fusion beliefs, modify how thoughts are experienced
and modify thought-control strategies. Metacognitive therapy,
which has important clinical differences compared with cognitive
behavior therapy (see Fisher, 2009) also aims at modifying beliefs
about rituals and encourages the use of new stop signals.
Preliminary results (Fisher & Wells, 2005, 2008) suggest this
therapy may be a brief and effective intervention.
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a b s t r a c t
Wells’ (Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders: a practice manual and conceptual guide.
Chichester, UK: Wiley) metacognitive model of obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) predicts that
metacognitions must change in order for psychological treatment to be effective. The aim of this study
was to explore: (1) if metacognitions change in patients undergoing exposure treatment for OCD; (2) to
determine the extent to which cognitive and metacognitive change predicts symptom improvement and
recovery. The sample consisted of 83 outpatients with a diagnosis of OCD who completed exposure and
response prevention treatment. The Yale–Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS), the Meta-
cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ-30) and the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44) were adminis-
tered before treatment, after treatment, and at 12-month follow-up. Treatment resulted in signiﬁcant
changes in symptoms, metacognition score, responsibility and perfectionism. Regression analysis using
post-treatment Y-BOCS as the dependent variable indicated that when the overlap between predictors
was controlled for, only changes in metacognition were signiﬁcant. Changes in metacognitions explained
22% of the variance in symptoms at post-treatment when controlling for pre-treatment symptoms and
changes in mood. A further regression revealed that two MCQ-30 subscales made individual contribu-
tions. The patients had signiﬁcantly higher scores compared to community controls on the MCQ-30.
Patients who achieved clinical signiﬁcant change had lower scores on the MCQ-30 compared to patients
who did not change. The results did not change signiﬁcantly from post-treatment to follow-up assess-
ment. These ﬁndings provide further support for the importance of metacognitions in treating OCD.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Few studies have examined the cognitive predictors of outcome
in patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) undergoing
psychological treatments. Early studies (see Steketee & Shapiro,
1995) discussed factors such as comorbid depression and the
presence of over-valued ideas as potential markers of poor
response to exposure and response prevention treatments. A study
by Whittal, Thordarson, & McLean (2005) found that cognitive
behaviour therapy (CBT) produced changes in measures of beliefs
(Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44; OBQ-44) considered impor-
tant in OCD. Using CBT and exposure and response prevention
(ERP) they found effect sizes ranging from 0.80 to 1.22 for the OBQ-
44 subscales. Change scores for these cognitive measures showed
moderate to strong correlations with changes in obsessive–
compulsive symptoms (0.34–0.52 for the OBQ-44).
Emmelkamp, van Oppen, & Balkom (2002) conducted two
studies investigating cognitive change following ERP for OCD. In
their second study, 28 patients completed ERP treatment. The
scores for the original version of theObsessive Beliefs Questionnaire
(OBQ-87) and the Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory (III-31;
Obsessive Compulsive Cognition Working Group, 2001) changed
signiﬁcantly from pre-treatment to post-treatment. However, the
only signiﬁcant difference between responders and non-responders
was on the total score on the III-31 and its two subscales known as
‘‘Importance of thoughts’’ and ‘‘Responsibility’’. In their concluding
remarks they noted that evidence supporting the importance of
changing cognitions in ERP for OCD is far from conclusive and
that other assessment procedures may be more useful.
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A study by van Oppen et al. (1995) included a different cognitive
measure of irrational beliefs and found effect sizes of 0.36–0.40
when using cognitive therapy or ERP. A later study introduced
related measures of cognition (O’Connor et al., 2006) and found
that responders showed signiﬁcantly more changes in obsessional
conviction, beliefs in consequences, and in beliefs about the need to
perform rituals as compared to non-responders.
Although different cognitive factors have been suggested as
important in the maintenance of OCD, disappointingly few treat-
ment studies have demonstrated the impact of these cognitions.
Perhaps it is this lack of treatment studies including measures of
cognition that has led to questions about the need to challenge
thoughts in cognitive behaviour therapy (Longmore & Worrell,
2007) and whether a focus on cognition in CBT for OCD is really
necessary (Clark, 2005).
Cognitive changes may appear to occur in cognitive- and expo-
sure-based treatments. However, the development of measures to
assess beliefs considered important inOCD ismuchmore recent and
little is knownabout the domains of belief change that correlate best
with improvement in OCD symptoms during treatment. The picture
is more complicated because different models of OCD have
emphasized different belief domains in the etiology and mainte-
nance of disorder. Cognitive approaches based on schema theory
propose that beliefs concerning inﬂated responsibility for pre-
venting harm are central (e.g. Salkovskis, 1985). On the other hand
domains such as intolerance of uncertainty (e.g. Frost & Shows,
1993) and perfectionism (e.g. Frost & Steketee, 1997) have been
given prominence by other theorists. In contrast to these
approaches, the metacognitive theory (Wells, 1997) is based on the
principle that OCD is a consequence of the over-importance given to
thoughts because of underlying metacognitive beliefs and
processes. In this model a range of metacognitive beliefs and
processes are implicated.
According to the metacognitive model, intrusive thoughts or
doubts activate meta-beliefs (Wells, 1997). These beliefs include
beliefs about the danger and meaning of such thoughts and
encompass beliefs about the harmful effects of thoughts, the need
to control them, and beliefs about the importance of monitoring for
them and engaging in perseverative coping strategies such as
worry and rumination. According to Wells these beliefs inﬂuence
appraisals of intrusions and responses to them which affect
emotional reactions.
Evidence of relationships between metacognitions and OCD
symptoms has been demonstrated using non-patient samples
(Gwilliam, Wells, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Myers &Wells, 2005;
Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2008), experimental studies (Fisher &Wells,
2005b), and patient group comparisons (Janeck, Calamari, Rie-
mann, & Heffelﬁnger, 2003). Metacognitive Therapy (MCT: Wells,
2009) has been pilot tested in a case series (Fisher & Wells, 2008),
and as a component of small group treatment (Rees & van Koesveld,
2008).
It is beyond the scope of our study to describe in depth the
different cognitive models of OCD. However, Purdon & Clark (1999)
have highlighted the differences among the cognitive behavioural
model of Salkovskis (1985, 1989, 1998), Rachman’s (1997, 1998)
model for obsessions and the metacognitive model of Wells (1997).
Some of the most important aspects involve the fact that neither
Wells’ metacognitive model nor Rachman’s theory deals directly
with perfectionism, and the metacognitive model gives no impor-
tance to the role of responsibility. The metacognitive model is the
only approach that speciﬁes that OCD can be explained by a small
set of metacognitive beliefs and it is also unique in its focus on the
role of beliefs about rituals, and the unhelpful criteria used for
when a ritual can be stopped (stop-signals). The metacognitive
model and treatment focus on the thought-process used in order to
deal with the intrusive thoughts (e.g. preservative thinking such as
worry, and self-monitoring) and does not focus on the actual
content of obsessions or self-schemas. In contrast Rachman focuses
on misinterpretations of the personal signiﬁcance of obsessions
and underlying self-schemas. In contrast, other CBT approaches
focus on the probability of threat and challenge responsibility. The
MCTapproach focuses on beliefs about thoughts and the processing
style used to deal with them. For instance, a CBT therapist could use
pie-charts and guided discovery in order to challenge the patient’s
probability and responsibility beliefs concerning contamination
and ask questions such as: ‘‘could you deliberately murder
someone by not washing your hands?’’ (e.g. Salkovskis, 1999), but
the MCT therapist asks: ‘‘what’s the point in worrying about
contamination?’’.
Different instruments have been developed in order to measure
the constructs highlighted by the cognitive and metacognitive
models of OCD. The Obsessive Compulsive Cognition Working
Group (1997, 2001) developed the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire
to assess a range of beliefs thought to be linked to OCD and
a revised version, the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44),
followed. The OBQ-44 has three subscales that assess responsi-
bility/threat, perfectionism/certainty and importance/control of
thoughts. The questionnaire distinguishes between patients with
OCD and other controls, and changes on the OBQ-44 seem corre-
lated with improvement in obsessive–compulsive symptoms
(Whittal et al., 2005).
The Metacognitions Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cart-
wright-Hatton, 2004) was developed in order to measure beliefs
about worry and intrusive thoughts and metacognitive processes
such as the tendency to focus attention on and monitor thinking.
The scale measures beliefs about the need to engage in worry,
negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts,
beliefs about need to control thoughts, and domains of cognitive
conﬁdence and cognitive self-consciousness. Research using the
original version of the MCQ with 65 items found that the subscales
distinguished patients with OCD and non-patient controls (Cart-
wright-Hatton & Wells, 1997).
Given the paucity of research on the effects of OCD treatment on
cognition, the different emphasis given by theories on cognitive
and metacognitive domains, and the recent availability of pub-
lished measures of these domains, the current study explored the
effects of exposure therapy and cognitive behaviour therapy
(mainly exposure based) on beliefs and addressed the question:
which type of change – metacognitive or cognitive predicts
improvement in symptoms following treatment?
Method
Participants
Eighty-three outpatients were included. Fifty completed indi-
vidual exposure and response prevention treatment (ERP), while 33
completed cognitive behaviour therapy (mainly exposure and
response prevention-based treatment) in a group format. The main
criteria of inclusion for all studies involved having OCD as the
dominant disorder. Diagnostic interviews including Y-BOCS
assessment (Goodman et al., 1989a, 1989b) were completed by
trained independent raters before and after treatment. Sixty clients
were interviewed using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, &Williams, 1995), while the remaining 23
were assessed using the Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule for
DSM-IV (Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994). A detailed description of
the ﬁnal sample’s demographic and diagnostic information is
provided in Table 1. Different OCD subtypes were present: 21.7%
had mainly washing rituals, 30.1% checking, 25.3% had both
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washing and checking, 21.7% had mental rituals/order/symmetry,
and one patient presented hoarding problems.
Patients were excluded if they met criteria for psychotic disor-
ders, alcohol- or drug addiction, showed suicidal behaviours, had
a general assessment of functioning below 50, or if they had
received exposure therapy during the last six months. A total of 28
patients were excluded from the individual treatments. For the
group therapy sample, six patients were excluded and 12 people
with OCD symptoms refused treatment. A total of four patients
dropped out of the individual treatment condition and one dropped
out of the group therapy. Assessments and sessions were audio- or
videotaped. Sixteen randomly chosen videos of diagnostic assess-
ment were checked with inter-rater analysis completed by inde-
pendent raters. The agreement rate for the OCD diagnosis was 100%
and a correlation of 0.97 was found for 20 Y-BOCS interviews.
Treatment and adherence
The individual treatments were based on Kozak & Foa (1997).
The therapists included graduate psychology students, psycholo-
gists, and one psychiatrist. The group therapy used groups con-
sisting of six participants and they were led by one psychologist
and one psychiatrist. The groups met once a week for a total of
twelve 2.5-h long sessions. The group treatment was adapted from
a manual developed by Krone, Himle, & Nesse (1991). Every group
therapy session included the presentation of a topic that was
relevant to the treatment of OCD (e.g. the nature of OCD, principles
of behaviour therapy, family life, and lifestyle). Other interventions
employed in the groups in addition to ERP included the use of
workbooks (with information about OCD, space for taking notes
and forms to document daily compliance and progress), attempts at
externalizing the OCD (e.g. ‘‘OCD is a bully, let’s ﬁght back’’), and
ﬁnally the use of coping statements (e.g. ‘‘it’s not me it’s my OCD’’).
No other cognitive techniques were used for the group treatments.
Thirty-six of the individual treatments used ERP with no extra
cognitive techniques. However, 14 of the individual treatments
included cognitive techniques such as Socratic questioning, pie-
charts, and cognitive restructuring. In a control analysis we
compared any potential differences between the individual CBT
treatments and the individual ERP treatments using t-tests. No
signiﬁcant differential effects were found on change scores for the
Y-BOCS (t (48)¼ 0.60, p¼ 0.55), the OBQ-44 (t (48)¼ 0.67, p¼ 0.51),
the MCQ-30 (t (48)¼ 0.59, p¼ 0.56), and the Beck Depression
Inventory (t (48)¼ 1.14, p¼ 0.26). Likewise, additional control
analyses using t-tests and the Chi-square tests indicated that there
were no differences between the two groups in demographic and
diagnostic variables such as age, gender, civil status, subtype, and
comorbid disorders.
For 23 of the individual treatments, therapists’ ratings of
average minutes of exposure per session and number of completed
homework assignments were measured. A total of 43.3 (SD¼ 23.1)
homework assignments were completed and the amount of
minutes with exposure per session averaged 53.8 (SD¼ 9.9). These
results were similar to previous reports of adherence to the same
manual using experienced professional therapists (Vogel, Stiles, &
Go¨testam, 2004). For the remaining individual treatments, the
therapists’ conﬁdence in using the manual was measured on a 0–
100 scale before treatment, yielding a mean of 76.1 (SD¼ 6.9).
There was no adherence measure for the group therapy, but
supervision by one of the developers of the manual was given and
the detailed protocol was not deviated from. The individual treat-
ments used 90-min sessions which were delivered twice a week. A
mean of 15.88 (SD¼ 2.82) sessions was given.
Patients on a stable dose of selective serotonin-reuptake
inhibitors (SSRI) or selective serotonin–norepinephrine reuptake
inhibitors (SNRI) were allowed. Approximately half the sample
used these medications, but ﬁve did not have adequate clinical
dosages. The patients using these medications had higher Y-BOCS
scores at pre-treatment compared to the non-medicated patients,
but there were no differences regarding Y-BOCS, MCQ-30, or the
OBQ-44 results at post-treatment or follow-up. Participants were
encouraged to remain on a stable dosage throughout the treatment.
However, one patient started taking SSRI/SNRI during the treat-
ment, while another patient reduced the dosage during treatment.
Measures
OCD symptoms
The Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale interview
(Goodman et al., 1989a, 1989b) was used as the measure of treat-
ment outcome. Five obsession and ﬁve compulsion items are
assessed on 0–4 point ratings. Only total scores were used in our
study. Ten of the 45 Y-BOCS follow-up scores were based on a self-
report version. Cronbach’s alphas were 0.58 at pre-treatment and
0.91 at post-treatment. The lowalpha at pre-treatment is considered
a consequence of excluding patient with Y-BOCS scores below 16.
The Y-BOCS at pre-treatment has a high degree of kurtosis and is not
normally distributed. This leads to decreased internal consistency.
Metacognitions
The MCQ-30 (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) is a 30-item
self-report scale measuring beliefs about thinking. Responses are
required on a four-point scale ranging from 1 (do not agree) to 4
(agree very much). A ﬁve-factor structure exists: (1) positive beliefs
about worry; (2) negative beliefs about the controllability of
thoughts and corresponding danger; (3) cognitive conﬁdence; (4)
negative beliefs about thoughts in general/need to control
thoughts; and (5) cognitive self-consciousness. High scores reﬂect
more reported problems with the item in question (note: a high
cognitive conﬁdence score indicates lesser trust in one’s memory).
Alpha levels were acceptable with 0.90 for the total scale. The
alphas for the subscales ranged from 0.75 to 0.83.
Obsessive beliefs
The OBQ-44 (Obsessive Compulsive Cognition Working Group,
2005) is a 44-item self-report measure with three subscales. The
OBQ-44 is a measure which is designed speciﬁcally to measure
cognitions in OCD. The three subscales are: (1) responsibility/
threat, referring to the belief that one is obligated to prevent
negative events due to exaggerated beliefs in the likelihood of harm
occurring; (2) perfectionism/certainty, referring to intolerance of
imperfection and mistakes; and (3) importance/control
of thoughts, referring to the belief that the mere occurrence of
thoughts implies that they are meaningful and dangerous and that
these thoughts should be controlled. The importance/control of
thoughts subscale has been labelled as a ‘‘metacognitive’’ construct
in the original paper on the OBQ (Obsessive Compulsive Cognition
Table 1
Characteristics of the OCD sample (N¼ 83).
Demographics M (SD)/% (N) Comorbidity % (N)
Age 34.2 (11.9) Depressive disorder 37.3 (31)
Female gender 71.1 (59) Panic/Agoraphobia 18.1 (15)
Working/studying 54.2 (45) Social anxiety disorder 21.7 (18)
Married/cohabitant 63.9 (53) GAD 18.1 (15)
Duration of OCD in years 14.4 (11.5) Speciﬁc phobia 12.0 (10)
Using SSRI/SNRI 50.6 (42) PTSD 7.2 (6)
Note. Depressive disorder includes dysthymia, major depression and recurrent
depression. GAD¼Generalized anxiety disorder, PTSD¼ Post-traumatic stress
disorder.
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Working Group, 1997) with reference to the work of Clark & Purdon
(1993). The subscale has itemswhich resemble some of the items in
the MCQ-30, but it does not provide the wide range of domains
represented with the MCQ-30. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.93 for
responsibility/threat, 0.91 for perfectionism/certainty, and 0.82 for
importance/control of thoughts.
Depressed mood
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery,
1979) is a 21-item self-report inventory, which has been shown to
be a reliable and valid measure of depression severity in both
clinical and non-clinical populations (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988).
The Cronbach alpha in the present study was 0.90.
Overview of data analyses
For our ﬁrst analyses we calculated effect sizes for comparisons
with other studies. Furthermore, we calculated the proportion of
patients achieving clinically signiﬁcant change, improving, and
showing no change according to the criteria of Fisher & Wells
(2005a). Comparisons of treatment responders’ and non-
responders’ change scores on obsessive beliefs and metacognitions
were also calculated using independent t-tests. These analyses
were followed by correlational analyses investigating the rela-
tionship between changes in symptoms and changes in beliefs.
We then conducted regression analyses to predict outcome
using pre-treatment levels of obsessive–compulsive symptoms in
step 1, changes in depressed mood on the second step, before
entering change scores in the non-metacognitive beliefs measured
by the OBQ-44. For the last stepwe investigated the inﬂuence of the
metacognitive variables. In the fourth and ﬁnal step the change
score for the MCQ-30 was entered along with changes in the
importance/control of thoughts subscale of the OBQ-44 since it was
originally described as a metacognitive construct (Obsessive
Compulsive Cognition Working Group, 1997). For the second
regressionwe reversed the order of the metacognitive and the non-
metacognitive factors. For the third and ﬁnal regression analysis we
used forward regression in order to explore which individual
subscales made independent contributions. Finally, correlation
coefﬁcients for post-treatment and follow-up results were calcu-
lated for the obsessive–compulsive symptoms, cognitive beliefs,
and metacognitive beliefs in order to assess the stability of the
results.
Results
Treatment effects
Y-BOCS changes indicated a large effect size, although the
intention to treat effects would be smaller because ﬁve patients
dropped out of treatment. Individual treatment was more effective
than group therapy at post-treatment, t (81)¼3.35, p¼ 0.001,
however, there was no difference at follow-up. Greater MCQ-30
changes were observed at post-treatment for the individual treat-
ments, t (81)¼2.31, p¼ 0.023, but again this difference was not
signiﬁcant at follow-up. A summary of the pre–post effects on
obsessive–compulsive symptoms, metacognitions, and obsessive
beliefs is presented in Table 2.
According to Fisher & Wells’ (2005a) criteria for treatment
response, 23% were asymptomatic and 53% achieved clinically
signiﬁcant change. These results are in line with other research
using exposure and response prevention for OCD. Gender, civil
status, employment status, use of medication, number of comorbid
disorders, age, and duration of OCD were not related to outcome.
However, patients with comorbid generalized anxiety disorder
(GAD) had more symptoms after treatment, t (81)¼2.04,
p¼ 0.045. The effect of GAD was not signiﬁcant at follow-up.
Clinical signiﬁcant change analyses
Using convenience sampling our research group has collected
MCQ-30 data from 385 community controls in preparation of
a study on the psychometric properties of the MCQ-30. A
comparison of the patient and normal control samples is displayed
in Fig. 1, which employs a bar graph including 95% conﬁdence
intervals for the mean MCQ-30 scores. We investigated how MCQ-
30 scores were distributed among different categories of outcome
for the patient group. The ﬁgure also showsmeanMCQ-30 scores at
post-treatment for patients who achieved clinical signiﬁcant
change, were improved, or did not change. Clinical signiﬁcant
change (CSC) indicates a post-treatment result of 14 points or less
on the Y-BOCS and at least a 10-point change. Improvement
involves achieving reliable change which is a 10-point change or
more, but scoring above the clinical cut-off. No change involves
having neither reliable change nor ending up below the clinical cut-
off of 14.
The patients had higher total scores on the MCQ-30 when
starting treatment compared to the controls (64.37 [SD¼ 15.40] vs.
52.66 [SD¼ 11.76], t (466)¼ 7.82, p< 0.0001). Patients who ach-
ieved CSC had signiﬁcantly lower scores at post-treatment
compared to patients who were improved (45.51 [SD¼ 9.77] vs.
59.66 [SD¼ 13.60], t (49)¼ 3.37, p¼ 0.001) as well as patients who
did not achieve change (60.06 [SD¼ 17.91], t (74)¼ 4.54,
p< 0.0001). In addition the patients who achieved CSC actually had
signiﬁcant lower scores compared to the controls (t (426)¼3.90,
p¼ 0.0001).
Comparisons of responders and non-responders
Emmelkamp et al. (2002) deﬁned treatment response as
achieving at least 33% improvement on the Y-BOCS. Using the same
criteria in our study we ﬁnd that 68.7% of the total sample
responded to the treatment. Independent t-tests were used to test
possible differences between the two groups. Table 3 shows
a summary of the comparison for the change scores obtained by the
treatment responders and non-responders on the OBQ-44 and the
Table 2
Paired samples t-tests and effect sizes (d) for pre-treatment and post-treatment tests of obsessive–compulsive symptoms, metacognitions, and obsessive beliefs (N¼ 83).
Measure Range Pre-treatment Post-treatment t d (r)
Y-BOCS 0–40 23.84 (3.72) 12.23 (6.36) 16.33a 2.23 (0.74)
MCQ-30 30–120 64.37 (15.40) 52.31 (15.42) 8.26a 0.78 (0.36)
OBQ-44 – Responsibility/Threat 1–7 4.04 (1.47) 2.95 (1.28) 8.01a 0.79 (0.37)
OBQ-44 – Perfectionism/Certainty 1–7 3.85 (1.33) 3.22 (1.33) 4.94a 0.47 (0.23)
OBQ-44 – Importance/Control of thoughts 1–7 3.10 (1.10) 2.54 (1.17) 4.74a 0.49 (0.24)
Note. Y-BOCS¼Yale–Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale, MCQ-30¼metacognitions questionnaire 30; and OBQ-44¼Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44.
ap< 0.0001.
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MCQ-30. The treatment responders had signiﬁcantly higher change
scores for all the cognitive and metacognitive subscales.
Correlational analyses
Changes in the OBQ-44 and the MCQ-30 subscales were all
signiﬁcantly correlated (p< 0.01) with both the Y-BOCS post-
treatment score and the change scores. For the OBQ-44, the
correlations ranged from 0.35 for the importance/control of
thoughts subscale to 0.48 for the perfectionism subscale. For the
MCQ-30 subscales the correlations ranged from 0.35 for the
cognitive self-consciousness subscale to 0.39 for the positive beliefs
about worry and the need to control thoughts subscales. The OBQ-
44 subscales and the MCQ-30 intercorrelations ranged from 0.55 to
0.69. A summary of these correlations is shown in Table 4.
Regression analyses
Deciding on variables to control for in regression analyses is
difﬁcult since research on predictors for OCD has shown inconsis-
tent results (Steketee & Shapiro, 1995). As previously mentioned
demographic variables were not related to outcome in our study.
Due to the lack of potential predictors and the limited sample size
we chose to control for pre-treatment levels of obsessive–
compulsive symptoms and changes in mood. We conducted three
regression analyses for the post-treatment data. For the ﬁrst anal-
ysis (model 1) we wanted to explore the impact of changes in
metacognitions on obsessive–compulsive symptoms when
controlling for changes in responsibility/threat and perfectionism/
certainty. Pre-treatment levels of obsessive–compulsive symptoms
were entered in step 1. The results indicated that symptoms at pre-
treatment were related to outcome and explained 7% of the vari-
ance. Change in depressed mood was entered in the second step
and added another 7% of the variance in the model. On step 3 the
block of variables consisting of change in responsibility/threat and
perfectionism/certainty was entered and they explained a signiﬁ-
cant additional 18% of the variance in post-treatment Y-BOCS score.
In the fourth step the total MCQ-30 change score along with the
change in the importance/control of thoughts subscale of the OBQ-
44 explained an additional 7% of the variance in Y-BOCS. On the
ﬁnal step of the equation only Y-BOCS pre-treatment scores and
change in MCQ-30 emerged as signiﬁcant independent predictors
of post-treatment symptom levels.
In a second follow-up regression analysis we reversed the order
of the metacognitive and the non-metacognitive dimensions. The
results indicated that metacognition explained a signiﬁcant addi-
tional 22% of the variance in symptoms after controlling for pre-
treatment symptom levels and change in depressed mood. The
non-metacognitive constructs of responsibility/threat and perfec-
tionism/certainty in the fourth step did not make a signiﬁcant
contribution. As a block the responsibility and perfectionism vari-
ables did not explain additional variance in the model after meta-
cognitions were entered.
For the ﬁnal regression analysis (model 2) wewere interested in
determining the relative importance of the ﬁve MCQ-30 subscales.
Since all ﬁve subscales have previously been shown to be correlated
with obsessive–compulsive symptoms, we chose to do a forward
regression in order to see whether someweremore important than
others. Two subscales came out as signiﬁcant. The strongest
subscale was change in ‘‘need to control thoughts’’ which explained
11% of the variance. In addition, changes in the subscale ‘‘positive
beliefs about worry’’ also explained 4%. A summary of the regres-
sion analyses is given in Table 5.
Follow-up analyses
Data from 45 patients (54.2%) were available from a 12-month
follow-up assessment. The 45 who agreed to take part in the
follow-up assessment were not different compared to those who
did not in terms of Y-BOCS, OBQ-44, or MCQ-30 scores at pre-
and post-treatment. Obsessive–compulsive symptoms did not
change much from post-treatment to follow-up (from 12.13
[SD¼ 5.61] at post-treatment to 13.00 [SD¼ 8.35] at follow-up).
The correlation between Y-BOCS post-treatment and Y-BOCS
follow-up was 0.67, while the correlation between MCQ-30 at
post-treatment and at follow-up was 0.83, and for the OBQ-44
the correlation was 0.74. Twenty-three patients were categorized
as having clinical signiﬁcant change at follow-up and 22 were
categorized as having no change/deterioration. One patient was
classiﬁed as having deteriorating Y-BOCS scores. When comparing
the clinical signiﬁcant change group with the no change/deteri-
oration group a signiﬁcant difference for the MCQ-30 scores at
follow-up was found (45.94 [10.07] vs. 61.25 [15.21], t (43)¼ 4.00,
p< 0.0005). For the OBQ-44 scores the difference was also
signiﬁcant (2.29 [1.00] vs. 3.16 [1.26], t (40)¼ 2.47, p¼ 0.018). Due
to the smaller sample size at follow-up as well as the relatively
stable results (paired samples t-test showed no signiﬁcant
changes in any of the measures).
Table 3
Mean pre–post change scores for treatment responders and non-responders on
measures of cognitive and metacognitive beliefs.
Change scores Mean (SD),
Non-responders
(N¼ 26)
Mean (SD),
Responders
(N¼ 57)
t
OBQ-44 total 0.17 (0.49) 1.05 (1.02) 5.27**
Responsibility/Threat 0.40 (0.93) 1.39 (1.23) 3.63**
Perfectionism/Certainty 0.04 (0.78) 0.94 (1.19) 3.83**
Importance/Control 0.15 (0.89) 0.75 (1.12) 2.40**
MCQ-30 total 4.26 (10.20) 15.75 (12.93) 4.00**
Positive beliefs about worry 0.22 (1.71) 1.23 (2.63) 2.57**
Uncontrollability and danger 2.08 (4.02) 4.80 (4.08) 2.83**
Cognitive conﬁdence 0.38 (2.98) 2.07 (3.86) 2.87**
Need to control thoughts 1.78 (3.37) 4.51 (4.12) 2.95**
Cognitive self-consciousness 1.00 (4.14) 3.14 (3.50) 2.44*
Note. OBQ-44¼Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44, MCQ-30¼metacognitions
questionnaire 30.
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01.
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Fig. 1. Means and conﬁdence intervals for the MCQ-30 total scores (range 30–120) for
community controls (N¼ 385) and the OCD sample (N¼ 83) at pre-treatment and
post-treatment for those achieving clinically signiﬁcant change (CSC), reliable
improvement, or no change.
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Discussion
This study set out to evaluate cognitive and metacognitive
changes in patients undergoing exposure treatment for OCD, and to
determine which of these changes best correlate with symptom
improvements. The treatment delivered was effective and the
overall clinical effectiveness commensuratewith other trials of OCD
as analysed by Fisher & Wells (2005a).
We found that metacognitive beliefs and beliefs concerning
perfectionism and responsibility decreased signiﬁcantly during the
course of treatment. The correlations between changes in the OBQ-
44 and changes in obsessive–compulsive symptomswere similar to
that of previous research (Whittal et al., 2005). Patients who made
clinically signiﬁcant change but not those that were simply
improved or made no change had signiﬁcantly lower post-treat-
ment scores on metacognition.
The main ﬁnding of our study was that change on the MCQ-
30 explained a large proportion of the variance in obsessive–
compulsive symptoms. Change in metacognitions was a better
predictor of outcome symptom levels than change in beliefs
about responsibility and perfectionism. When the overlap
between predictors was controlled for, only metacognition was
signiﬁcant.
Further analyses showed that during treatment, change in two
dimensions of metacognition independently predicted post-
treatment symptom severity. These were beliefs about the need to
control thoughts and positive beliefs about the need toworry. These
results are consistent with the idea that response to treatment is
associated with change in metacognitions and identiﬁes two
particular domains that are relevant in the metacognitive model
of OCD.
The design of the present study cannot address issues con-
cerning the causal relationship between metacognitive belief
change and symptom improvement during treatment. It could be
the case that improvement in symptoms causes improvement in
metacognitions rather than the converse being the case. Exposure
and response prevention therapy was originally based upon
habituation, not cognitive change, which could suggests that
change in cognitions is a consequence of symptom reduction. This
could be addressed in future studies that make repeated
measurements throughout treatment to assess which variables
change ﬁrst. However, a prospective study using the MCQ-30 and
other metacognition measures shows that they predict the subse-
quent development of OCD symptoms (Sica, Steketee, Ghisi, Chiri, &
Franceschini, 2007). This at least provides evidence supporting
a causal role of metacognitions in the development of OCD. It seems
reasonable to assume on the basis of these data that meta-
cognitions could probably contribute to OCD and that changing
them may be instrumental in recovery.
The study might be improved by including multiple measures of
obsessive–compulsive symptoms. The inclusion of other self-report
measures of obsessionality or distress could possibly lead to
different results. However, the Y-BOCS is the gold-standard for
measuring obsessive–compulsive symptoms and it covers all
different subtypes of OCD. Also, the Y-BOCS shows meaningful
correlations with the cognitive and metacognitive measures
suggesting that it is a reasonable measure for the purposes of our
study. How speciﬁc cognitions and metacognitions could affect the
wide range of obsessive–compulsive subtypes differently could be
a topic for future research. A possible limitation of our study is the
use of the OBQ-44 as the only measure of responsibility and
perfectionism. Using more detailed measures of these constructs
could possibly lead to different results. However, a related study by
Myers & Wells (2005) which included the Responsibility Attitude
Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000) found that responsibility was not
associated with obsessive–compulsive symptoms when controlling
for metacognitions and worry, while metacognitive beliefs pre-
dicted obsessive–compulsive symptoms independent of responsi-
bility and worry.
Table 4
Intercorrelations for changes in belief domains (metacognitive and non-meta-
cognitive) and obsessive–compulsive symptoms.
2 3 4 5 6
1 Y-BOCS post-treatment 0.83 0.53 0.47 0.40 0.44
2 Y-BOCS D 0.51 0.41 0.48 0.35
3 MCQ-30 D 0.69 0.55 0.58
4 OBQ-44 Responsibility/Threat D 0.59 0.56
5 OBQ-44 Perfectionism/Certainty D 0.47
6 OBQ-44 Importance/Control of thoughts D
Note. All correlations are signiﬁcant at p< 0.01. Y-BOCS¼Yale–Brown Obsessive–
Compulsive Scale; MCQ-30¼metacognitions questionnaire 30; and OBQ-
44¼Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44.
Table 5
Statistics for each step of the regressions with post-treatment Y-BOCS regressed on
pre-treatment Y-BOCS, change in mood, and change in cognitive and metacognitive
predictors (N¼ 83).
F cha R2 cha B SE B b t
Model 1
Step 1 5.90 0.07*
Y-BOCS pre 0.45 0.18 0.26 2.43*
Step 2 6.77 0.07*
Y-BOCS pre 0.56 0.18 0.33 3.07**
BDI total D 0.20 0.08 0.28 2.60*
Step 3 9.96 0.18***
Y-BOCS pre 0.49 0.17 0.29 2.86**
BDI total D 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.47
Responsibility/Threat D 1.42 0.63 0.27 2.25*
Perfectionism/Certainty D 1.39 0.67 0.26 2.06*
Step 4 4.63 0.07**
Y-BOCS pre 0.42 0.17 0.25 2.51*
BDI total D 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.72
Responsibility/Threat D 0.30 0.71 0.06 0.43
Perfectionism/Certainty D 1.02 0.66 0.19 1.54
MCQ-30 total D 0.18 0.07 0.38 2.63**
Importance/Control of thoughts D 0.48 0.69 0.08 0.70
Reversed order
Step 1 5.90* 0.07
Y-BOCS pre
Step 2 6.77* 0.07
BDI D
Step 3 13.61*** 0.22
MCQ-30 D
Importance/Control of thoughts D
Step 4 1.68 0.03
Responsibility/Threat D
Perfectionism/Certainty D
Model 2
Step 1 5.90* 0.07
Y-BOCS pre 0.45 0.18 0.26 2.43*
Step 2 6.77* 0.07
Y-BOCS pre 0.56 0.18 0.33 3.07**
BDI D 0.20 0.08 0.28 2.60**
Step 3 12.00*** 0.11
Y-BOCS pre 0.42 0.18 0.24 2.35*
BDI D 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.66
Need to control thoughts D 0.61 0.18 0.39 3.46***
Step 4 4.30* 0.04
Y-BOCS pre 0.46 0.18 0.27 2.66**
BDI D 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.44
Need to control thoughts D 0.49 0.18 0.31 2.67**
Positive beliefs about worry D 0.57 0.28 0.22 2.07*
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, and ***p< 0.001.
Note. The second regression analysis used forward regression for all the ﬁve
subscales of the MCQ-30. Y-BOCS¼Yale–Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale; MCQ-
30¼metacognitions questionnaire 30; and BDI¼ Beck Depression Inventory.
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Emmelkamp et al. (2002) noted that the results regarding the
evidence documenting the importance of changing cognitions in
ERP for OCD are far from conclusive and that other assessment
procedures may be more useful. The results from our current study
indicate that it could be a question of which cognitions or meta-
cognitions are actually addressed.
That metacognitions change and this is associated with better
clinical outcomes is entirely consistent with the metacognitive
model and treatment of OCD (Wells, 1997, 2009). However,
exposure and response prevention is not designed to alter meta-
cognitions but is instead predicated on principles of habituation. It
is possible that treatment focusing on altering metacognitions
speciﬁcally may produce more effective or faster outcomes.
Moreover, it may be the case that extensive exposure may not be
necessary to promote recovery if the mechanism is metacognitive
change rather than habituation. Two studies shed some light on
this supposition. In the ﬁrst, Fisher & Wells (2005b) ran an exper-
imental study in which patients with obsessive–compulsive
disorder were exposed to a loop-tape of their intrusive thoughts
under two experimental conditions. Under one condition theywere
given a habituation-rationale while under the other condition they
were given a metacognitive-rationale that emphasized exposure to
thoughts as means of testing beliefs about them. Themetacognitive
condition produced signiﬁcantly greater reductions in distress, urge
to neutralize and reductions in metacognitive beliefs than the
habituation condition. In another study, Fisher & Wells (2008)
treated a series of patients withWells’ metacognitive therapy. Even
though that treatment did not involve prolonged or repeated
exposure it was associated with large improvements in OCD
symptoms and metacognitive beliefs that were stable across
follow-up.
In conclusion, the present study is the ﬁrst to show that good
response to exposure and response prevention treatment is asso-
ciated with reduction in metacognitions. Although the study
cannot address the causal role of metacognitive change in deter-
mining response to treatment, the ﬁndings are consistent with the
metacognitive model of OCD and the emphasis it gives on focusing
on modiﬁcation of metacognitions in treatment.
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